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I. INTRODUCTION
The Ku Klux Klan (KKK) Act' was the third of four major federal civil
1. Ch. 22, 17 Stat. 13 (1871) [hereinafter cited as KKK Act]. The Act is
formally entitled "An Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment to the Constitution of the United States, and for other Purposes," but
became known popularly as either the KKK Act or the Civil Rights Act of 1871.
Section 1983 is derived from § I of the KKK Act. Although the language of §
1983 and § 1 of the KKK Act are similar, there are two significant differences.
First, the KKK Act provided for original jurisdiction for all claims arising under §
1 in the federal district and circuit courts. Section 1983's jurisdictional counter-
part is located in 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (Supp. 11 1979). Jurisdiction under §
1343(a)(3) is not coextensive with § 1983. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare
Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600 (1979) (discussed at text accompanying notes
295-303 infra). Second, § 1 of the KKK Act protected only "rights, privileges, or
immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States." Section 1983 pro-
vides a remedy for "the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immunities
secured by the Constitution and laws." (Emphasis added.)
Section 1985(3) derives from § 2 of the KKK Act. Section 2 of the KKK Act
differs from § 1985(3) in that it provided not only civil but criminal penalties, as
well. Also, § 2 of the KKK Act had its own jurisdictional component for the
recovery of damages in the federal district and circuit courts. Section 1985(3)'s
jurisdictional counterpart is embodied in 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(1) (Supp. III
1979).
The comprehensiveness and coherence of the KKK Act was shattered by the
revision of the United States Statutes in 1874 when the provisions of the KKK Act
were separated and scattered throughout the Revised Statutes. The civil remedy
embodied in § 1 of the KKK Act was modified by adding the words "and laws"
and placed in Rev. Stat. § 1979 (1874) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Supp. III 1979)). The provision for jurisdiction in the district courts for a claim
under § 1 of the KKK Act was placed in Rev. Stat. § 563(12) (1874). Section
563(12) gave district courts jurisdiction to hear suits to redress the deprivation,
under color of state law, of any right secured by the Federal Constitution or by
"any law of the United States." The provision for original jurisdiction in the cir-
cuit courts for a claim under § 1 of the KKK Act was placed in id. § 629(16). Section
629(16) gave circuit courts original jurisdiction to hear suits to redress the
deprivation, under color of state law, of any right secured by the Federal Con-
stitution or "any law providing for equal rights." The Judicial Code of 1911
adopted the "any law providing for equal rights" language of Rev. Stat. § 629(16)
(1874), rather than the "any law of the United States" language of id. § 563(12).
Act of March 3, 1911, ch. 231, § 24(14), 36 Stat. 1087 (current version at 28
U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (Supp. III 1979)).
Section 2 of the KKK Act also was revised in 1874. The criminal sanction of §
2 was placed in Rev. Stat. § 5519 (1874), and was held to be uncolistitutional in
Baldwin v. Franks, 120 U.S. 678 (1887), and United States v. Harris, 106 U.S. 629
(1882). But cf. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1976) (criminal analogue to § 1985(3)). The civil
remedy in § 2 of the KKK Act was placed in Rev. Stat. § 1.980 (1874) (current ver-
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rights statutes enacted during the Reconstruction Period.2 Sections 1 and 2
sion at 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. III 1979)). The jurisdictional parts of§ 2 of the
KKK Act were placed in Rev. Stat. § 563(11) (1874) (jurisdiction for the district
courts) and id. § 629(17) (jurisdiction for the circuit courts) (current version at 42
U.S.C. § 1343(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979)).
2. The first civil rights act of this period was entitled "An Act to protect all
Persons in the United States in their Civil Rights, and furnish the Means of their
Vindication." Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (1866). It became popularly known as the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. The first ancestor of § 1983 is found in § 2 of this Act. It pro-
vided only criminal penalties for any person who, under color of state law,
statute, ordinance, regulation, or custom, deprived another "of any right secured
or protected by this act," which included the right to contract and the right to
hold property irrespective of race. Id. § 1 (current version at 42 U.S.C. §§
1981-1982 (1976)).
The second civil rights act of this period was the Enforcement Act of 1870,
formally entitled "An Act to enforce the Right of Citizens of the United States to
vote in the several States of this Union, and for other Purposes." Ch. 114, 16 Stat.
140. See also Act of Feb. 28, 1871, ch. 99, 16 Stat. 433 (protecting voting rights).
The second precursor of § 1983 can be found in § 17 of the Enforcement Act,
while an analogue to § 1985(3) can be found in § 6 of this Act. See 18 U.S.C. § 241
(1976). Section 18 of the Enforcement Act of 1870 re-enacted the Civil Rights Act
of 1866, including § 2 of that Act which was the first ancestor of § 1983. This was
done because of concern that the § 2 power under the thirteenth amendment,
under which the 1866 Act was enacted, was not broad enough to support the Civil
Rights Act of 1866. The re-enactment came after the ratification of the four-
teenth amendment. Thus, the § 5 power under that amendment was available to
sustain this legislation. J. TENBROEK, THE ANTISLAVERY ORIGINS OF THE FOUR-
TEENTH AMENDMENT 183-84 (1951); Gressman, The Unhappy History of Civil
Rights Legislation, 50 MICH. L. REV. 1323, 1333-34 (1952).
The third civil rights statute of this period was the KKK Act. See note 1
supra. Although § 1 of the KKK Act, the direct precursor of 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(Supp. III 1979), had been preceded by § 2 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which
in turn had been re-enacted in the Enforcement Act of 1870, § 1 of the KKK Act
was the first § 1983-type legislation to provide a civil remedy. See CONG. GLOBE,
42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 68 (1871) ("The model for enacting... [§ 1 of the KKK
Act] will be found in the second section of the act of April 9, 1866, known as the
'civil rights act.' That section provides a criminal proceeding in identically the
same case as ... [§ 1 of the KKK Act] provides a civil remedy for .... ") (remarks
of Rep. Shellabarger).
The fourth civil rights act of this period was entitled "An act to protect all
citizens in their civil and legal rights." Ch. 114, 18 Stat. 335 (1875). This Act pro-
vided "[t]hat all persons within thejurisdiction of the United States shall be entitled
to the full and equal enjoyment of the accommodations, advantages, facilities,
and privileges of inns, public conveyances on land or water, theaters, and other
places of public amusement." Thus, its coverage was similar to Title II of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000a (1976). The 1875 Act was found to be un-
constitutional in the Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
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of that Act are the predecessors of sections 1983 s and 1985(3), 4 respec-
tively. Because the statutes possess a common origin, the historical
3. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. 1111979). Before obtaining legal or equitable
relief under § 1983, the plaintiff must show:
(1) that the defendant
(a) is a "person"
(b) who was acting "under color of'
(c) any State or Territorial "statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage";




(3) that the defendant acted with the requisite mental state; and
(4) that the defendant caused the injury complained of.
The Supreme Court has stated:
By the plain terms of § 1983, two-and only two-allegations are re-
quired in order to state a cause of action under that statute. First, the
plaintiff must allege that some person has deprived him of a federal
right. Second, he must allege that the person who has deprived him of
that right acted under color of state or territorial law.
Gomez v. Toledo, 100 S. Ct. 1920, 1923 (1980). It may be necessary to plead only
two allegations, but the cases show that these are causation problems under §
1983, see text accompanying notes 169-89 infra, and the cases show that an as yet
undefined mental state requirement may exist under § 1983, see notes 82-105 and
accompanying text infra.
4. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. III 1979). The pertinent elements of §
1985(3) discussed in this Comment that the plaintiff must show can be outlined as
follows:
(1) that the defendant is one of
(a) two or more
(b) "persons"
(c) who conspire, or "go in disguise on the highway or on the
premises of another";
(2) that the purpose of the conspiracy or the proscribed disguised activ-
ity was to deprive
(a) "any person or class of persons" of the
(i) equal protection of the laws, or
(ii) the equal privileges and immunities under the laws;
(3) that the defendant acted with the requisite mental state, which is a
"racial, or perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discrimina-
tory animus"; and
(4) that the two or more persons conspiring or engaging in the pro-
scribed disguised activity
(a) did, or caused to be done, "any act in furtherance of the ob-
ject of such conspiracy"
(b) whereby "another" is
(i) injured in his person, or
374 [Vol. 46
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background, legislative history, and purposes of the two statutes are large-
ly the same. These similarities invite comparison.
The purpose of this Comment is to compare the breadth of liability
under section 1983 and section 1985(3) with respect to organizations that
are state actors for purposes of the fourteenth amendment, public
organizations, and of organizations that are not state actors for purposes of
the fourteenth amendment, private organizations. The liability of super-
visory officials who are agents of public and private organizations also will
be examined.
II. THE ELEMENTS OF SECTION 1983 AND SECTION 1985(3)
A. Possible Defendants
1. Possible Defendants under Section 1983
There are two requirements that must be met before an organization
or supervisory official can be a defendant under section 1983: (1) the
defendant must be a "person" for purposes of the statute and (2) the defen-
dant must be acting "under color of state law." Section 1983 applies on its
face to "[e]very person." There are two primary means to avoid "person"
status under the statute. The first is by way of definition, i.e., by finding
that the particular organization or entity involved was not intended to be
included within the meaning of the word "person." Second, an analytically
distinct but equally effective method for a defendant to avoid classification
as a "person" under section 1983 is for the defendant to be within one of
those classes of persons to whom the judiciary has granted an absolute im-
munity from section 1983 suit.
In the Dictionary Act,5 enacted two months prior to the KKK Act, it
was stated that "the word 'person' may extend and be applied to bodies
politic and corporate."'6 A public organization (state actor) probably
would be a "body politic" under this definition and a private organization
(nonstate actor) probably would be a "body corporate." The United States
Supreme Court has held however, that the Dictionary Act's definition of
"person" "is merely an allowable, not a mandatory, one."'7 The Court has,
thus, reserved to itself the power to decide whether private organizations,
public organizations, and the state itself are included within the meaning
of the word "person."
(ii) property, or
(iii) "deprived of having and exercising any right or privi-
lege of a Citizen of the United States."
See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102-03 (1971).
5. Ch. 71, 16 Stat. 431 (1871).
6. Id. § 2 (emphasis added).
7. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 191 (1961) (overruled in part in Monell
v. Department of Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
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Although it never has been held explicitly, the Supreme Court has in-
dicated that a private corporation is a "person" within the meaning of sec-
tion 1983. In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co.,8 the Court did not discuss
whether the defendant-private corporation was a "person," but remanded
the case leaving open the possibility of private corporate liability under
section 1983. In addition, the Court inMonellv. Department of Social Ser-
vices stated that "by 1871, it was well understood that corporations should
be treated as natural persons for virtually all purposes of constitutional
and statutory analysis." 9
The issue of whether a public organization or local governmental unit
is a "person" for purposes of section 1983 has had a stormy history. In
Monroe v. Pape,'0 the Court decided that municipalities were not "per-
sons" under section 1983 for the purpose of recovering damages." This
decision was based on the Forty-Second Congress' rejection of the Sherman
Amendment to the KKK Act. That Amendment would have held local
governmental units liable for certain injuries caused by "persons riotously
and tumultuously assembled together."' 2 It was reasoned that since Con-
gress had rejected an amendment to the KKK Act that would have made
local governmental units liable, the word "person" in section 1 of that Act,
which later became section 1983, was not intended to include local govern-
mental units.
In Monell v. Department of Social Services,'- the Court re-evaluated
the legislative history of section 1983 and concluded "that Congress did in-
8. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
9. 436 U.S. 658, 687 (1978).
10. 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (overruled in part in Monell, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
11. Id. at 187-92. The Court in City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507
(1973), extended the holding of Monroe to preclude injunctive relief against
municipalities. In Moor v. County of Alameda, 411 U.S. 693 (1973), it was held
that counties were not persons under § 1983 for the purpose of recovering
damages. In Moor, the plaintiff argued unsuccessfully that counties were persons
under California law and that under 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976), state law is adopted
in the construction of§ 1983 if state law is necessary to make that statute effective.
See also Mt. Healthy School Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274 (1977)
(reserving the question whether local school boards are "persons" under § 1983);
Aldinger v. Howard, 427 U.S. 1 (1976) (reaffirming Monroe and Moor).
12. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 749 (1871). As first proposed the
Sherman Amendment made the "inhabitants of the county, city, or parish"
liable. Id. at 663. Under the first conference substitute for the Sherman Amend-
ment only the "county, city, or parish," not its inhabitants, could be held liable.
Id. at 749. The second conference substitute for the Sherman Amendment, the
version that was finally adopted, became § 6 of the KKK Act. Ch. 22, § 6, 17 Stat.
15 (1871) (current version at 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1976)). The text of the Sherman
Amendment and the two conference substitutes are found in the appendix to
Monell, 436 U.S. at 702-04.
13. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
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tend municipalities and other local government units to be included
among those persons to whom § 1983 applies.' 41 4 The Court reasoned that
the Sherman Amendment had been rejected by Congress because that
Amendment imposed liability on municipalities and counties for riot
damage. This liability in effect placed an obligation on cities and counties
to keep the peace. It was argued that Congress had no constitutional
authority to impose such an obligation on subdivisions of a state. Thus, the
Sherman Amendment was rejected because of its questionable constitu-
tionality, not because it imposed liability on local governmental units. 5
Section 1 of the KKK Act, unlike the Sherman Amendment, created no
unconstitutional burden on municipalities. Instead, section 1 was "in-
tended to give a broad remedy for violations of federally protected civil
rights."'16 Since municipalities could violate the rights or interests encom-
passed by section 1 just as other persons could, "there is no reason to sup-
pose that municipal corporations would have been excluded from the
sweep of § 1."17
Whether the state itself, apart from its various subdivisions, comes
within the definition of the word "person" in section 1983 is unclear. In
Quern v. Jordan, '8 it was argued that Monel's holding that a municipality
was a "person" would affect the states' eleventh amendment immunity
from suit in federal court for retroactive damages.' 9 Justice Rehnquist
stated that MonelFs holding was "limited to local government units which
are not considered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes."20
Justice Brennan, concurring in result only, argued that the majority
opinion impliedly held that a state could not be a "person" under section
14. Id. at 690. Under Monell there may be two limitations on municipal
liability under § 1983. First, there may be a tenth amendment limitation on
municipal liability if the § 1983 claim is based on the violation of a federal
statutory right or the violation of a right secured by some part of the Constitution
other than the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 690 n.54. Second, in dicta, Monell
stated that the plaintiff may not rely solely on a vicarious liability theory, in-
cluding respondeat superior, when bringing a § 1983 action against a municipal-
ity. Id. at 691. Only those agents "whose edicts or acts may fairly be said to repre-
sent official policy" may create liability for a municipality. Id. at 694. See notes
180-89 and accompanying text infra.
15. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 804 (1871) (remarks of Rep.
Poland), quoted in Monell, 436 U.S. at 664; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 190.
16. 436 U.S. at 685.
17. Id. at 685-86. The Court also supported the proposition that municipal
corporations were intended to be "persons" by citing the Dictionary Act, and by
noting that the doctrine that corporations should be treated for all intents and
purposes as persons had been extended to municipal corporations by 1871. Id. at
688 (citing Cowles v. Mercer County, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 118 (1869)).
18. 440 U.S. 332 (1979).
19. See Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
20. 440 U.S. at 338 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 690 n.54).
1981]
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1983.21 Under Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer22 and Hutto v. Finney,23 a state's
eleventh amendment immunity from suit in federal court may be abro-
gated if two requirements are met: (1) Congress enacted a statute pursuant
to any power clause in the Constitution that follows the eleventh amend-
ment chronologically24 and (2) Congress intended that statute to abrogate
the state's eleventh amendment immunity.25 Justice Brennan reasoned
that because section 1983 was enacted pursuant to the enforcement power
of the fourteenth amendment, the first requirement for abrogation of the
eleventh amendment immunity is satisfied. 26 Justice Brennan argued that
if a state were a "person" for purposes of section 1983, the requisite intent
to abrogate the eleventh amendment immunity would exist, and, thus, the
states' eleventh amendment immunity would be abrogated in section 1983
actions.27 Because the majority in Quern v.Jordan held that the state does
have an eleventh amendment immunity from suit in federal court under
section 1983, Justice Brennan found that it necessarily concluded that a
state is not a "person" for purposes of section 1983. If Justice Brennan's
reasoning is accepted, the state itself, as distinct from any of its subdivi-
sions, is not a "person" under section 1983.
The second means by which a defendant can avoid being included as a
"person" within the meaning of section 1983 is by being in one of those
classes of persons which has been granted an absolute immunity. To date
there are four such classes: legislators, 28 judges, 29 prosecutors, 0 and
21. Id. at 350-51 (Brennan, J., concurring).
22. 427 U.S. 445 (1976).
23. 437 U.S. 678 (1978).
24. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976) (fourteenth amend-
ment § 5 power clause).
25. In Hutto v. Finney, 437 U.S. 678 (1978), the Court held that The Civil
Rights Attorney's Fees Awards Act of 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-559, 90 Stat. 2641
(codified at 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976)), was enacted pursuant to the § 5 power of
the fourteenth amendment and was intended to abrogate the states' eleventh
amendment immunity. This case indicates that the intent to abrogate the
eleventh amendment immunity need not be shown on the face of the statute. 437
U.S. at 693-94.
Actions under both § 1983 and § 1985(3) are covered by The Civil Rights At-
torney's Fees Awards Act of 1976. This Act allows a prevailing party to recover
reasonable attorney's fees at the trial court's discretion.
26. 440 U.S. at 351 n.3 (Brennan, J., concurring).
27. Id. at 350-51 (Brennan, J., concurring).
28. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 379 (1951).
29. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 553-55 (1967). See also Stump v.
Sparkman, 435 U.S. 349, 364 (1978) (immunity for acts in judicial capacity).
30. Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409, 431 (1976). The absolute quasi-
judicial immunity has been extended to other court officials. See, e.g., Slotnick v.
Staviskey, 560 F.2d 31, 32 (1st Cir. 1977) (judge's clerk), cert. denied, 434 U.S.
1077 (1978); Kermit Constr. Corp. v. Banco Credito Y Ahorro Ponceno, 547 F.2d
1, 2-3 (1st Cir. 1976) (receiver).
[Vol. 46
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possibly public defenders. 1 There are two basic reasons given for these ab-
solute immunities. First, Congress, by using vague, general language,
could not have intended to abrogate the common law absolute immunities
that existed at the time of the statute's enactment.3 2 Second, there is a
policy rationale that by granting this immunity, legislative, judicial, and
31. The Court has not decided explicitly whether public defenders are en-
titled to an absolute immunity under § 1983. In Ferri v. Ackerman, 444 U.S. 193
(1979), it was decided that an attorney appointed by a federal court to represent a
defendant in a criminal trial was not entitled to an absolute immunity in a sub-
sequent state malpractice suit brought against him by his former client. Id. at
205. Although Ferri was not a § 1983 case, the United States Court of Appeals for
the Eighth Circuit has interpreted Ferri to preclude granting an absolute im-
munity to public defenders, and instead has granted a qualified immunity or
good faith affirmative defense to court-appointed counsel. Dodson v. Polk Coun-
ty, 628 F.2d 1104, 1107-08 (8th Cir. 1980); White v. Bloom, 621 F.2d 276, 280
(8th Cir. 1980). See alsoJohn v. Hurt, 489 F.2d 786, 788 (7th Cir. 1973) (granting
court-appointed counsel a qualified immunity from § 1983 suit). For a discussion
of the good faith affirmative defense, see text accompanying notes 106-34 infra.
Prior to Ferri most federal courts of appeals dismissed § 1983 actions against
public defenders. Some courts of appeals held that public defenders do not act
under color of state law because they act for an individual client just as a privately
retained attorney would. See, e.g., Skipper v. Brummer, 598 F.2d 427, 428 (5th
Cir. 1979) (per curiam), vacated, 444 U.S. 1063 (1980); United States ex rel. Sim-
mons v. Zibilich, 542 F.2d 259, 261 (5th Cir. 1976) (per curiam); O'Brien v. Col-
bath, 465 F.2d 358, 359 (5th Cir. 1972) (per curiam); Brown v. Schiff, 614 F.2d
237, 238-39 (10th Cir.) (per curiam), cert. denied, 100 S. Ct. 2164 (1980);
Espinoza v. Rogers, 470 F.2d 1174, 1174-75 (10th Cir. 1972) (per curiam). For a
discussion of the "under color of state law" requirement of § 1983, see notes 34-46
and accompanying text infra. Other courts of appeals have held that public
defenders have an absolute quasi-judicial immunity from a § 1983 suit similar to
that of prosecutors as established in Imbler v. Pachtman, 424 U.S. 409 (1976).
See Housand v. Heiman, 594 F.2d 923, 924-25 (2d Cir. 1979) (per curiam) (either
the court-appointed attorney does not act under color of state law or has an ab-
solute immunity from suit); Waits v. McGowan, 516 F.2d 203, 205 (3d Cir. 1975)
(public defenders immune from § 1983 suit); Brown v. Joseph, 463 F.2d 1046,
1049 (3d Cir. 1972) (public defender does not act under color of state law, but
even if he does, he enjoys immunity from § 1983 suit), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 950
(1973); Minns v. Paul, 542 F.2d 899, 900-01 (4th Cir. 1976) (public defenders
have an absolute immunity from § 1983 suit, without deciding whether court-
appointed attorneys act under color of state law), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 1102
(1977); Robinson v. Bergstrom, 579 F.2d 401, 411 (7th Cir. 1978) (per curiam)
(public defenders act under color of state law, but have an absolute immunity
from § 1983 suit); Miller v. Barilla, 549 F.2d 648, 649 (9th Cir. 1977) (public
defenders enjoy absolute quasi-judicial immunity). See generally Note, The Im-
munity of Public Defenders Under Section 1983, 27 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 244
(1978); Liability of Public Defenders Under Section 1983: Robinson v.
Bergstrom, 92 HARV. L. REV. 943 (1979).
32. Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367, 376 (1951).
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quasi-judicial freedom of decision is preserved from any inhibition that
civil liability might create. 33
The second requirement that must be met before an organization or
individual can be a defendant under section 1983 is that the defendant act
"under color of any [State or Territorial] 3 4 statute, ordinance, regulation,
custom, or usage." The "under color of" requirement of section 1983 "has
consistently been treated as the same thing as the 'state action' required
under the Fourteenth Amendment."35 In Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co. ,3 it
was stated that "[w]hatever else may also be necessary to show that a person
has acted 'under color of [a] statute' for purposes of § 1983 .... we think it
essential that he act with the knowledge of and pursuant to that statute."3 7
There are at least two problems with this language. First, the "[w]hatever
else may be also necessary" language leaves open the possibility of addi-
tional requirements.3 " Second, it may be that the requirement that the
defendant act pursuant to statute in order to act under color of a state
statute is inconsistent with Monroe v. Pape.39 In Monroe, the defendant-
police officers violated state law as well as plaintiff's fourth and fourteenth
amendment rights by searching his home without a warrant, by detaining
him for ten hours on open charges, and by subjecting him to a strip search
in front of his family. These police officers could hardly be said to be act-
ing pursuant to state law because they were violating state law. Never-
theless, they were said to be acting under "color of state law. '40
Statutes, ordinances, and regulations of a state or territory seem to be
qualitatively different from the customs and usages of a state or territory in
that the former are usually written or recorded in some permanent way
and are subject to objective verification, while the latter are more depen-
dent on sociological knowledge than legal acumen. 41 Yet in Adickes v.
33. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 554 (1967).
34. Puerto Rico is considered either a territory or a state under § 1983. Ex-
amining Bd. of Eng'rs, Architects & Surveyors v. Flores De Otero, 426 U.S. 572,
579 (1976). The District of Columbia is neither a state nor territory for purposes
of § 1983. District of Columbia v. Carter, 409 U.S. 418, 432 (1973).
35. United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 n.7 (1966) (holding that the
"under color of" requirement of 18 U.S.C. § 242, the criminal counterpart of §
1983, has the same meaning as the "under color of" requirement of 42 U.S.C. §
1983).
36. 398 U.S. 144 (1970).
37. Id. at 161 n.23.
38. See Flagg Bros. v. Brooks, 436 U.S. 149, 156 (1978).
39. 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (overruled in part in Monell, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
40. "Misuse of power, possessed by virtue of state law and made possible only
because the wrongdoer is clothed with the authority of state law, is action taken
'under color of' state law." Id. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic', 313 U.S.
299, 326 (1941)).
41. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 181 (1970) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting in part). Justice Douglas not only argued that "custom or usage" should
380 [Vol. 46
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S.H. Kress & Co., it was decided that a "'custom, or usage, of [a] State' for
purposes of § 1983 must have the force of law by virtue of the persistent
practices of state officials." 42 This, in effect, only allows a plaintiff to show
that a state official has engaged in a "systematic maladministration" of
law.4 3 Since a "custom or usage" of a state must have the force of law by vir-
tue of the persistent practices of state officials, it is a plausible inference
that all persons acting under color of such a custom or usage are state ac-
tors for purposes of the fourteenth amendment.
Assuming that the "under color of state law" requirement of section
1983 is the equivalent of the state action requirement of the fourteenth
amendment, then only public officials and organizations, which are by
definition state actors, can be held liable under section 1983.44 Interest-
ingly, there is at least one way for a private actor to satisfy the state action
requirement of the fourteenth amendment and thus act under color of
state or territorial law: a private actor conspires or acts jointly with at least
one state actor to deprive another of a constitutional right. 45 One limita-
tion on the conspiracy or joint activity theory of state action used to be that
if all the state actors who conspire or act jointly with the private actors have
an absolute immunity from section 1983 suit, then all the private actors in-
volved in the conspiracy may have a vicarious immunity from section 1983
suit. This position is no longer viable. 4
6
2. Possible Defendants under Section 1985(3)
Section 1985(3) requires that "two or more persons in any State or Ter-
ritory conspire or go in disguise on the highway or on the premises of
another. '47 Both sections 1983 and 1985(3) use the word "person."
be defined by the binding forces of the social mechanism, he also contended that
the word "of" refers to the "geographical area or political entity in which the
'custom' originates and where it is found." Id. at 182 (Douglas, J., dissenting in
part). Thus, under Douglas' theory of "custom or usage" in § 1983, if the defen-
dant acted in accordance with an established social practice within the
geographical area of the state or territory, then the defendant acted under color
of a custom of the state or territory.
42. Id. at 167.
43. The term systematic maladministration of law comes from the remarks
of Representative Garfield during the debate on the KKK Act.
But the chief complaint is not that the laws of the State are unequal, but
that even where the laws are just and equal on their face, yet, by a
systematic maladministration of them, or a neglect or refusal to enforce
their provisions, a portion of the people are denied equal protection
under them.
CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app. 153 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Garfield).
44. See text accompanying notes 234-36 infra.
45. Adickes v. S.H. Kress & Co., 398 U.S. 144, 152 (1970). See United States
v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 794 (1966) (interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 242).
46. See generally Dennis v. Sparks, 101 S. Ct. 183 (1980).
47. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. III 1979).
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Because of their common origin, the definition of the word "person" under
both statutes may be the same. 48 If this proposition is true, then
municipalities and private corporations, which are "persons" under sec-
tion 1983, may be "persons" under section 1985(3).
Section 1985(3), unlike section 1983, has rio state action or under color
of state law requirement on its face. For this reason, its criminal counter-
part49 was declared unconstitutional in United States v. Harris50 and
Baldwin v. Franks.5" In Collins v. Hardyman,52 a predecessor statute of
section 1985(3) was interpreted as requiring state action to avoid the con-
stitutional problems encountered in reaching private parties under the
fourteenth amendment. In 1971 the state action requirement of Collins
was overruled in Griffin v. Breckenridge.3 In Griffin, a two-step process of
analysis was adopted for section 1985(3). First, there is an inquiry to see if
the statutory requirements are met. Because there is no state action re-
quirement in the statute, no state action is needed at this point. Second, if
the defendants are private actors, a search for a constitutional premise
that will reach private action is made, i. e., one is allowed to sift through
48. See, e.g., Flesch v. Eastern Pa. Psychiatric Inst., 434 F. Supp. 963, 975
(E.D. Pa. 1977); Boling v. National Zinc Co., 435 F. Supp. 18, 22 (N.D. Okla.
1976); Veres v. County of Monroe, 364 F. Supp. 1327, 1330 n.5 (E.D. Mich.
1973), affd mem., 542 F.2d 1177 (6th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 431 U.S. 969
(1977).
Some courts have extended the definition of "persons" to include federal ac-
tors because there is no "under color of' state law requirement under § 1985(3).
See Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States, 515 F.2d 926, 931 (10th Cir. 1975);
Paton v. LaPrade, 471 F. Supp. 166, 170-71 (D.N.J.), remanded on other
grounds, 524 F.2d 862 (3d Cir. 1979); Peck v. United States, 470 F. Supp. 1003,
1011-12 (S.D.N.Y. 1979); Moriani v. Hunter, 462 F. Supp. 353, 356 (S.D.N.Y.
1978); Founding Church of Scientology v. Director, FBI, 459 F. Supp. 748, 753
(D.D.C. 1978); Stith v. Barnwell, 447 F. Supp. 970, 972-73 (M.D.N.C. 1978);
Alvarez v. Wilson, 431 F. Supp. 136, 140-41 (N.D. Ill. 1977); Williams v.
Wright, 432 F. Supp. 732, 737-38 (D. Or. 1976); Revis v. Laird, 391 F. Supp.
1133, 1138 (E.D. Cal. 1975), rev'd mem. sub nom. Revis v. Rumsfeld, 541 F.2d
286 (9th Cir. 1976). Contra, Bethea v. Reid, 445 F.2d 1163, 1164 (3d Cir. 1971),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1061 (1972); Lofland v. Meyers, 442 F. Supp. 955, 957
(S.D.N.Y. 1977); Morpurgo v. Board of Higher Educ., 423 F. Supp. 704, 714
(S.D.N.Y. 1976); Dickinson v. French, 416 F. Supp. 429, 433 (S.D. Ala. 1976);
Moore v. Schlesinger, 384 F. Supp. 163, 165 (D. Colo. 1974) (§ 1985(1));
Williams v. Halperin, 360 F. Supp. 554, 556 (S.D.N.Y. 1973). See also Com-
ment, A Construction of Section 1985(c) in Light of Its Original Purpose, 46 U.
CHI. L. REV. 402, 437-38 (1979) (arguing that the purpose of the KKK Act was to
make state and private actors liable, not federal actors).
49. Rev. Stat. § 5519 (1874).
50. 106 U.S 629 (1882).
51. 120 U.S. 678 (1887).
52. 341 U.S. 651 (1951).
53. 403 U.S. 88 (1971). See note 2, supra.
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the Constitution for a clause that grants Congress the power to reach
private parties under the particular facts of the case. In Griffin, the defen-
dants stopped a car on a highway and assaulted the black occupants of the
car. The plaintiffs' section 1985(3) claim reaching private parties was sup-
ported by the section 2 power of the thirteenth amendment, because this
act of racial discrimination could be considered a badge or incident of
slavery underJones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co.,"4 and the claim also was sup-
ported by the unenumerated constitutional right to interstate travel under
United States v. Guest.a5 Interestingly, in Griffin the issue whether private
parties may be reached under the fourteenth amendment section 5 power
was reserved expressly. - Because of the constitutional problems in apply-
ing section 1985(3) to private organizations and supervisory officials, its
main use, outside of racial discrimination cases, may involve public organ-
izations and supervisory officials, especially after Monell.
Section 1985(3) differs from section 1983 in that the former requires
that "two or more" persons engage in the proscribed activity before a cause
of action exists. A major issue in the area of organizational liability under
section 1985(3) is whether a single political or corporate entity can be a
"person" separate from its agents when the agents are acting within the
scope of their authority while depriving another of an interest encom-
passed by section 1985(3). If the organization is considered to be a
"9person" separate from its agents, then the required "two or more persons"
exist. On the other hand, if the organization and its agents are a single
legal entity by virtue of the agency relationship, there is only one "person"
and no liability on the part of either the organization or its agents will exist.
There are three approaches to the corporate conspiracy issue. The
majority rule, created in Dombrowskiv. Dowling,5 7 is that the plurality re-
quirement of section 1985(3) "is not satisfied by proof that a discrimina-
tory business decision reflects the collective judgment of two or more ex-
ecutives of the same firm."5 8 Rather, when an agent acts in his representa-
54. 392 U.S. 409 (1968).
55. 383 U.S. 745 (1966).
56. 403 U.S. at 107. A majority of the Court in United States v. Guest, 383
U.S. 745 (1966), held that Congress did have the power to punish private conspir-
acies that interfered with fourteenth amendment rights. The conspiracy in Guest
involved interference with the use of state-owned facilities. The state ownership of
these facilities may have provided the necessary state action for the conspiracy to
be punishable under the fourteenth amendment. Id. at 774-86 (Brennan, J., con-
curring and dissenting).
57. 459 F.2d 190 (7th Cir. 1 972) (Stevens, J.).
58. Id. at 196. Accord, Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66,
70-71 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976); Bellamy v. Mason's Stores,
Inc., 508 F.2d 504, 508 (4th Cir. 1974); Baker v. Stuart Broadcasting Co., 505
F.2d 181, 183 (8th Cir. 1974); Schroeder v. Dayton-Hudson Corp., 448 F. Supp.
910, 915 (E.D. Mich. 1977); Cole v. University of Hartford, 391 F. Supp. 888,
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tional capacity for a principal, only a single legal entity is involved and the
plurality requirement is not met. The Dombrowski rule banning intracor-
porate conspiracies may have at least three exceptions. First, there is the
violent acts exception. "We do not suggest that an agent's action within the
scope of his authority will always avoid a conspiracy finding. Agents of the
Klan certainly could not carry out acts of violence with impunity simply
because they were acting under orders from the Grand Dragon."-5 9 Second,
there is the multiple acts exception. If the organizational agents were
engaged in more than one act of discrimination, then the requisite plural-
ity may exist. 60 Third, there is the outside the scope ofauthority exception.
If any organizational agent acts outside the scope of his authority, that
agent does not act in a representative capacity so the required plurality of
persons exists. 61
The minority rule focuses on "the policies undergirding § 1985(c).96 2
This approach views the rule banning intracorporate conspiracies as
granting all organizations, private and public, and their agents an ab-
solute immunity from suit under section 1985(3). Finding that creating
such an absolute immunity would not serve any public function, this ap-
proach would allow intracorporate conspiracies. 63
890-94 (D. Conn. 1975); Milburn v. Blackfrica Promotions, Inc., 392 F. Supp.
434, 436 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Fallis v. Dunbar, 386 F. Supp. 1117, 1121 (N.D. Ohio
1974); Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 384 F. Supp. 202, 205 (N.D. Ill. 1974),
affd on other grounds, 524 F.2d 818 (7th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943
(1976). Cf. Nelson Radio & Supply Co. v. Motorola, Inc., 200 F.2d 911, 914 (5th
Cir. 1952) (establishing the single-legal entity doctrine under § 1 of the Sherman
Act).
59. Dombrowski, 459 F.2d at 196. But see Cole v. University of Hartford,
391 F. Supp. 888, 893 (D. Conn. 1975).
60. In Dombrowski, it was stated that "if the challenged conduct is essenti-
ally a single act of discrimination by a single business entity, the fact that two or
more agents participated in the decision or in the act itself normally will not con-
stitute the conspiracy contemplated by the statute." 459 F.2d at 196. Some courts
have interpreted this language to mean that if there are multiple acts of
discrimination, the ban on intracorporate conspiracies does not apply. Jackson v.
University of Pittsburgh, 405 F. Supp. 607, 612-13 (W.D. Pa. 1975); Rackin v.
University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992, 1005-06 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
61. See Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66, 71-72 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976); Cole v. University of Hartford, 391 F. Supp.
888, 893 (D. Conn. 1975) ("The plaintiff must ... allege that... [the corporate
agents] acted other than in the normal course of their duties.").
62. Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235, 1257 (3d
Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
63. "If, as seems clear under § 1985(c), the agreement of three partners to
use their business to harass any blacks who registered to vote constitutes an ac-
tionable conspiracy, we perceive no function to be served by immunizing such ac-
tion once a business is incorporated." Id. See Developments in the
Law-Criminal Conspiracy, 72 HARV. L. REV. 920, 951-53 (1959) ("Society is
[Vol. 46
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The third approach is an attempt to find a middle ground. In Dupree
v. Hertz Corp. ,64 it was held that whether an organization may be a
separate person from its agents depends on a number of factors. These fac-
tors include (1) whether the organization involved is large or small, (2)
whether there were single or multiple acts of discrimination, and (3) the
number of persons, agents, or entities involved in making or executing the
organizational decision. 6 Factors that may be added to this list include (4)
whether the organization is public or private and (5) the nature of the
discriminatory acts or decisions.
This type of factor analysis is unpromising. For example, the signifi-
cance of the size of the organization is of doubtful validity. If agents in
several subdivisions of a large organization engage in discriminatory acts,
it may be easier to see "two or more persons" involved because each of the
subdivisions of the large organization may be viewed as a separate person.
If the discriminatory act is engaged in by agents of a small closely held cor-
poration, however, it may be easier to see through the organization
because of the close relationship between those making the corporate deci-
sions and the probable lack of corporate formalities, and to view the act as
one of individuals.
Similarly, the significance of the number of agents involved is of
doubtful validity. If the number of agents involved is large, then at first
glance it seems unreasonable to find that only one "person" is acting. 66 If
the discriminatory act is committed by a small number of agents, however,
then the act can more easily be characterized as the act of a small con-
spiratorial band.
The nature of the discriminatory act may be an ambiguous factor. If
the discriminatory act complained of is a policy decision arrived at
through consensus of those at the top of the organization, it may be easy to
find an agreement, a requirement for a conspiracy. 67 If the act complained
of is an act of violence perpetrated by agents of the organization, however,
then under the case law it may be easier to say that the agent is a person
separate from the organizational entity. 66 Thus, two very different kinds of
acts both point to satisfaction of the "two or more persons" requirement.
In addition, it may be difficult to determine whether there are single
or multiple acts of discrimination involved in a claim. For example, if a
group on the board of directors of a savings and loan association agrees to
benefitted by viewing a corporation as a single legal entity only when its acts for
proper ends." Id. at 953).
64. 419 F. Supp. 764 (E.D. Pa. 1976).
65. Id. at 766.
66. The Dupree case indicates the greater the number of agents involved,
the more likely that there are two or more "persons" involved. Id.
67. See Developments in the Law-Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 63, at
925-27.
68. See Dombrowski, 459 F.2d at 196; text accompanying note 59 supra.
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"redline" an economically depressed geographical area, does that decision
constitute a single act or multiple acts of discrimination? One can argue
that a single decision was made that affected numerous individuals, thus
making the decision a single act of discrimination. On the other hand, this
situation could be characterized as an organization committing multiple
acts of discrimination by failing to consider the loan applications of a large
number of individuals. 69 Because it is unclear which way these factors
point, the judiciary might be wise to decide the hard question: whether it
wants to grant all incorporated organizations and their agents an absolute
immunity from suit under section 1985(3).
A generally recognized requirement of conspiracy is that there be an il-
legitimate agreement.70 In the case of section 1985(3), the proscribed
agreement would be one to deprive another of the equal protection of the
laws or the equal privileges and immunities under the law.'1 Assuming for
the moment that the agents of a corporate entity can "conspire" within the
meaning of section 1985(3),12 two questions must be answered before
liability can be imposed on a private or public organization: (1) can a cor-
porate entity-be a party to the illegitimate agreement; and (2) if so, what
has to be shown to prove that the agreement exists?
Since public and private organizations are artificial persons that can
act only through their agents, one needs a method of imputing the conspir-
atorial acts of agents to the corporate principal before the private or public
organization can be liable under section 1985(3). There are two methods
of imputing the corporate agents' acts to the corporate principal: the
vicarious liability theory and the identification theory. 7
Under the vicarious liability theory, the agreement of the agents is im-
puted to the corporation on the basis of the agency relationship. 4 The
vicarious liability theory may be unavailable, however, under section
1985(3), especially when the organization involved is a municipality. In
Monell, it was stated that "Congress did not intend municipalities to be
held liable unless action pursuant to official municipal policy of some
69. See 459 F.2d at 196. In Dombrowski, the plaintiff, a white lawyer, was
refused office rental space because most of his clients were blacks and Hispanics.
The court took the position that this was a single act of discrimination, although
it could be argued that the corporate decision resulted in multiple acts of discrim-
ination since every member of the class of potential Hispanic and black clients
was denied access to legal services in that location.
70. See Developments in the Law- Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 63, at
925-27.
71. See text accompanying notes 237-75 infra.
72. This could occur if the ban on intracorporate conspiracies were abolish-
ed or if one of the exceptions to the rule prohibiting intracorporate conspiracies
exists. See text accompanying notes 57-69 supra.
73. Goode, Corporate Conspiracy: Problems ofMens Rea and the Parties to
the Agreement, 2 DALHOUSIE L. REV. 121, 124-29 (1975).
74. Developments in the Law- Criminal Conspiracy, supra note 63, at 951.
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nature caused a constitutional tort. In particular, we conclude that a
municipality cannot be held liable solely because it employs a
tortfeasor."75 This language in Monell concerning section 1983 might be
used to limit vicarious liability theories under section 1985(3) since the two
statutes have a common origin.
The second theory by which the acts of agents may be imputed to a
corporate principal is the identification method.76 Under this theory, the
corporate entity is analogized to a human being and the agents are
analogized to parts of the body. Some agents are the hands of the cor-
porate entity; they do the work. Other agents represent the directing mind
or will of the corporation; because these agents act as the mind of the cor-
poration, their state of mind is that of the corporation. 77 Monell accepted
implicitly the identification method of imputing the acts of municipal
agents to the municipal principal. In dicta, it was stated that a municipal-
ity may be held liable under section 1983 only "when execution of a
government's policy or custom, whether made by its lawmakers or by those
whose edicts of acts may fairly be said to represent official policy, inflicts
the injury. ' 78 Thus, the key to municipal liability under section 1983 is be-
ing able to identify those agents of the municipality who represent official
policy, i.e., agents who act as the organizational mind. If a municipal
agent who represents the official policy of the organization "agrees" to
engage in conduct that injures interests protected by section 1985(3),
under the identification method of imputing liability to an organization,
the organization would become a party to the conspiracy.
If the identification method of imputing the conspiratorial acts of
agents to their principal is adopted, one may have to establish that a super-
visory official who represents official policy was a party to the illegitimate
agreement that is the basis of the section 1985(3) conspiracy. If an agent
with supervisory power knows in a general way that agents subject to his
supervision are planning acts of discrimination prohibited by section
1985(3) and does nothing to prevent the acts of discrimination, does the
supervisory agent become a co-conspirator with the lower-level agents?79 It
75. 436 U.S. at 691.
76. See Goode, supra note 73, at 124-29.
77. The dichotomy between hand-agents and mind-agents may not stand
up under practical application. For example, do policemen who patrol city
streets represent the state as policymakers or implementors of policy? Police im-
plement the law, but they also have the discretion to make many low visibility
decisions that may have broad policy implications.
78. 436 U.S. at 694 (emphasis added).
79. Under the "closest remaining criminal analogue to § 1985(3), 18 U.S.C.
§ 241," Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 98 (1971), if "the defendant aided
the conspirators knowing in a general way their purpose to break the law the jury
may infer that he entered into an express or implied agreement with them."
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has been held under section 1985(3) that "[i]f a party has the potential to
stop illegal activity but fails to do so, and sits idly by, then that party may
be said to have impliedly conspired in such illegalities." 80 A supervisor may
have the ability to prevent or to attempt to prevent illegal conduct by his
agents, yet making the supervisory agent a co-conspirator may be an un-
justified reading of section 1985(3)'s conspiracy requirement. Under 42
U.S.C. § 1986,81 a person who knows that wrongs proscribed by section
1985 are about to be committed and who has the power to prevent or aid in
preventing the commission of any of those wrongs but fails to do so is liable
for all damages caused by the wrongful acts which that person by reason-
able diligence could have prevented. If a person with knowledge and the
ability to prevent or aid in preventing damage done by the conspiracy were
a co-conspirator under section 1985(3), then section 1986 would be redun-
dant. Thus, it would follow that something more than knowledge and
ability to prevent or aid in preventing is needed to show that the super-
visory agent is a co-conspirator under section 1985(3).
B. Mental States
1. The Required Mental State under Section 1983: Proving
a Cause of Action and Establishing a Defense
There are two general sets of mental state requirements under section
1983. First, there is the state of mind on which the plaintiff has the
burdens of pleading, production, and persuasion. Second, there is the
state of mind that the defendant can plead and prove for a section 1983
good faith affirmative defense, sometimes called a qualified immunity.
The mental state requirement on which the plaintiff has the burden of
pleading, production, and persuasion is not defined clearly.8 2 Although
there is no explicit mental state requirement in the language of the
statute, 3 section 1983 may impose something other than a strict liability
standard.
80. Dickerson v. United States Steel Corp., 439 F. Supp. 55, 67 (E.D. Pa.
1977).
81. (1976). Section 1986 originated as the second conference substitute for
the rejected Sherman Amendment to the KKK Act. CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong.,
1st Sess. 804 (1871). See note 12 supra.
82. The primary reason for the underdevelopment of doctrine concerning
the mental state requirement that the plaintiff must plead and prove is that the
judiciary has been generous in handing out good faith affirmative defenses to
most public officials subject to § 1983 suit. See text accompanying notes 106-34
infra.
83. Section 1983 does require that the defendant "subjects, or causes [the
plaintiff] to be subjected... [to a] deprivation of any rights, privileges, or im-
munities secured by the Constitution and laws." 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III
1979). It might be argued that one cannot "subject" another to a deprivation of a
constitutional or federal statutory right, privilege, or immunity without in some
[Vol. 46
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In Baker v. McCollan,84 the Supreme Court reserved for later decision
the issue of what mental state the plaintiff must prove. The Court did state
that the "first inquiry in any § 1983 suit ... is whether the plaintiff has
been deprived of a right 'secured by the Constitution and laws.' 8"a- There
cannot be a deprivation of some kinds of constitutional or federal statutory
rights, privileges, or immunities unless the plaintiff shows that the defen-
dant was acting with a required mental state. For example, in order to
prevail in a fourteenth amendment equal protection claim where the
governmental act is not facially discriminatory, one must show that the
defendant acted with an "invidiously discriminatory purpose."8 6 Similarly,
before one may recover damages under the eighth amendment cruel and
unusual punishment prohibition as incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment, one must show at least that the state actor punishing the
plaintiff acted with deliberate indifference to the plaintiffs suffering.87
The constitutional or federal statutory substantive right which is the
basis of the section 1983 action may be however, the exclusive source of a
mental state requirement. In Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights
Organization,8 it was decided that section 1983 is a purely remedial
statute that does not provide for any substantive rights. This means that
section 1983 itself cannot be violated; it only remedies the violation of sub-
stantive rights created in the Constitution and in some federal statutes. 89 If
section 1983 is a purely remedial conduit, it is difficult to justify the crea-
tion of substantive limitations on the statute, such as a mental state
requirement.
Nevertheless, in Monroe v. Pape,90 it was suggested that a mental state
requirement exists although that substantive limitation does not appear on
the face of the statute. The Court, in Monroe, distinguished section 1983
from its criminal counterpart, 18 U.S.C. § 242,91 which has an explicit
"wilfully" mental state requirement.92
In the Screws Case we dealt with a statute that imposed
criminal penalties for acts "wilfully" done. We construed that
sense intending to do so. This may be inconsistent with Monroe's holding that
specific intent to deprive another of federal rights need not be shown to state a
claim under § 1983. 365 U.S. at 187. See text accompanying notes 90-96 infra.
84. 443 U.S. 137 (1979).
85. Id. at 140.
86. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 264-65 (1977); Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229, 242 (1976).
87. See Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104-05 (1976).
88. 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
89. See text accompanying notes 208 & 209 infra.
90. 365 U.S. 167 (1961) (overruled in part in Monell, 436 U.S. 658 (1978)).
91. (1976).
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word in its setting to mean the doing of an act with "a specific in-
tent to deprive a person of a federal right.". . . We do not think
that gloss should be placed on ... [section 1983] .... The word
"wilfully" does not appear in ... [section 1983]. Moreover....
[section 1983] provides a civil remedy, while in the Screws Case we
dealt with a criminal law challenged on the ground of vagueness..
. . [Section 1983] should be read against the background of tort
liability that makes a man responsible for the natural conse-
quences of his actions. 93
Just what the background of tort liability is that makes a man responsi-
ble for the natural consequences of his actions remains a mystery. In fact,
the phrase is internally inconsistent. The "background of tort liability"
language has been used to justify the creation of the good faith affirmative
defense, 94 while the "makes a man responsible for the natural conse-
quences of his actions" language has been used to justify a strict liability
standard under the statute.9 5 Monroe does establish, however, two things
with regard to any mental state requirement of section 1983. First, inten-
tional conduct, specific intent, or wilfullness need not be shown for all sec-
tion 1983 actions. 96 Second, there is some relationship between tort liabil-
ity and section 1983 liability.
This amorphous relationship between the "background of tort liabil-
ity" and section 1983 has led some courts to find the applicable standard of
care by analogizing the section 1983 action to the closest common law
tort. 97 For example, if a deprivation of a liberty interest without due pro-
cess under the fourteenth amendment is analogous to a state law false im-
prisonment action, one might be justified in reading the mental state re-
quirement of the state common law false imprisonment action into a sec-
tion 1983 action for deprivation of a liberty interest without due process. 98
93. 365 U.S. at 187 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
94. See Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556-57 (1967).
95. "We think it inconsistent to say a man is 'responsible for the natural con-
sequences of his action,' . . . and that he is responsible only if his actions are im-
properly motivated." Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781, 795 (5th Cir. 1968), cert.
denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969) (overruled in part in Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d 1210
(5th Cir. 1976)).
96. See notes 97 & 98 and accompanying text infra.
97. See, e.g., Roberts v. Williams, 456 F.2d 819 (5th Cir. 1972) (negligence
action); Whirl v. Kern, 407 F.2d 781 (5th Cir. 1968) (false imprisonment action),
cert. denied, 396 U.S. 901 (1969) (overruled in part in Bryan v. Jones, 530 F.2d
1210 (5th Cir. 1976)). See generally Kirkpatrick, Defining a Constitutional Tort
Under Section 1983: The State-Of-Mind Requirement, 46 U. CIN. L. REV. 45
(1977); Note, Section 1983 Liabilityfor Negligence, 58 NEB. L. REV. 271 (1979);
Comment, The Evolution of the State of Mind Requirement of Section 1983, 47
TUL. L. REV. 870 (1973).
98. There are at least three problems with the tort analogue approach.
First, if the tort analogue is an intentional tort, should a specific intent require-
ment be imposed on the § 1983 action? Monroe holds that specific intent to
[Vol. 46
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Monroe's reference to the background of tort liability did not explain what
happens when there is no state law tort analogue, i.e., no background of
tort liability to the constitutional or federal statutory violation that is the
basis of the section 1983 action. 99 It is unclear whether a negligence or a
strict liability standard should apply in such a case. The Court has yet to
decide the issue.100
Support for the simple negligence standard of care in all section 1983
actions can be found in Monroe's "background of tort liability" language.
Tort law at the time the KKK Act was enacted probably required persons
to be negligent before liability could be imposed. 101 Thus, to read section
1983 with this background in mind, one could conclude that the drafters
of the KKK Act adopted a negligence standard of care sub silentio. There
is a policy consideration supporting this conclusion: one cannot expect
public officials to conform their behavior to anything higher than a "rea-
sonable man" standard.102
Support for the strict liability standard can be found in the fact that
section 1983 has no mental state requirement on its face. 103 Additionally, a
deprive another of federal rights is not required under § 1983. 365 U.S. at 187.
Can this be reconciled with an intent requirement derived from § 1983's
"background of tort liability"?
Second, to what law does one look to find § 1983's "background of tort liabili-
ty"? Is the "background of tort liability" referred to in Monroe tort law that
existed in 1871 so that the drafter's of the KKK Act could have incorporated it in-
to the statute sub silentio, or is tort law as it exists today the background referred
to in Monroe?
Third, should the general law of torts be consulted to find the tort analogue or
should the law of the state where the § 1983 action arose be used to find the
analogue? If the individual state law is used, certainty and simplicity might be
gained, yet the result would be that the mental state element of § 1983 would vary
from state to state. See 42 U.S.C. § 1988 (1976). If a general tort law standard is
used, uniformity in the federal statutory cause of action is gained, yet there may
be little certainty as to what that general tort law standard is.
99. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978) (no tort analogue for
deprivation of a constitutionally required hearing).
100. Baker v. McCollan, 443 U.S. 137, 138-40 (1979). See also Procunier v.
Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978).
101. Professor Prosser has stated that the common law standard of
negligence as an independent basis of tort liability began to develop around 1825.
W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS 140 (4th ed. 1971). The KKK
Act was enacted in 1871.
102. The policy considerations supporting the § 1983 good faith affirmative
defense may justify a negligence standard of care under the statute. See text ac-
companying notes 116-18 infra.
103. Two recent cases support the strict liability standard. In Owen v. City of
Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980), Justice Powell in his dissent argued that
the Court had established a strict liability standard of care for municipalities by
denying them a good faith affirmative defense under § 1983. Id. at 1419 (Powell,
1981]
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strict liability standard of care may be the most effective means of pro-
moting compensation for an injury cognizable under section 1983 and
deterrence from creating the injury, two "background" policies animating
tort law. The strict liability standard promotes the compensation policy
underlying section 1983 better than a negligence standard because a non-
negligent deprivation of a constitutional or federal statutory right is as in-
jurious to the plaintiff as a deprivation caused by negligence. The deter-
rence policy is promoted better by a strict liability standard because of the
nature of federal constitutional or federal statutory rights, i. e., with a neg-
ligence standard of care one may be able to avoid liability by ignorance;
the strict liability standard would give public officials an incentive to edu-
cate themselves to the constitutional rights of the individuals who are af-
fected by their decisions. On the other hand, a strict liability standard
might cause the Court to restrict the rights or interests protected by section
1983 so as not to impose liability in situations where it would be unjust to
do so.
A compromise between the negligence and strict liability standards
might be found in terms of the remedy sought. 104 In a common law tort ac-
tion, money damages is generally the sole remedy. Section 1983 explicitly
allows a "suit in equity." If an action for money damages is brought, a
negligence standard of care might be appropriate because it would avoid
the unfair result of imposing money damages on someone who was "just
doing his job." If an equitable action is brought, a strict liability standard
might be more appropriate since equitable relief often does not impose
adverse economic effects on the defendant. On occasion, however, an in-
junction may impose as much or more economic cost on the defendant as
an action for money damages; in this event, an injunction could have as
much of an unfair punishing effect on the nonnegligent defendant as an
action for money damages. If the economic burden of the injunctive relief
will be borne not by the supervisory official but by a public organization,
however, a strict liability standard may still be justified because this
economic burden will be spread throughout the community. 105
J., dissenting). Gomez v. Toledo, 100 S. Ct. 1920 (1980), stated that only two
allegations need be pleaded for a § 1983 cause of action, neither of which is a
mental state requirement. Id. at 1923.
104. The Court has sanctioned using the nature of the remedy to determine
the mental state required under § 1983. In Wood v. Strickland, the Court in-
dicated that the good faith affirmative defense to § 1983 is available only against
claims for money damages. 420 U.S. 308, 315 n.6 (1975) ("immunity from
damages does not ordinarily bar equitable relief as well").
105. See Owen v. City of Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 1417 (1980), where
one of the justifications for denying municipalities a good faith affirmative
defense was an "equitable loss-spreading principle." Cf. Monell v. Department of
Social Servs., 436 U.S. 658, 693-94 (1978) (insurance theory was an insufficient
justification for the imposition of respondeat superior liability on municipalities).
[Vol. 46
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There is a different set of mental state requirements when the defen-
dant pleads and proves that he is entitled to a qualified immunity from sec-
tion 1983 suit. The qualified immunity is actually a good faith affirmative
defense on which the defendant has the burdens of pleading and produc-
tion. 106 The Court has held that policemen, 107 governors, presidents of
state universities, officers and members of state National Guard units, 1 08
local school board members,109 state hospital superintendants, 110 and
prison officials"1 have a qualified immunity to section 1983 suits for
money damages. 112
The sources of the good faith affirmative defense are tort law and
policy considerations. Monroe's enigmatic command that section 1983
"should be read against the background of tort liability that makes a man
responsible for the natural consequences of his actions"' 3 is one of the
justifications for the good faith affirmative defense. For example, "[p]art
of the background of tort liability, in the case of police officers making an
arrest, is the defense of good faith and probable cause."'1 4 Thus, the first
inquiry in determining whether an official has a good faith affirmative
defense or qualified immunity is determining whether the official had a
good faith affirmative defense under tort law.1 5
There are at least three public policy considerations justifying the
good faith affirmative defense: (1) imposing personal liability on public of-
ficials might deter qualified individuals from holding public office;" 6 (2)
106. Gomez v. Toledo, 100 S. Ct. 1920, 1924 (1980).
107. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547, 556-57 (1967).
108. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247 (1974) (survivors of students killed
at Kent State brought a § 1983 action against the governor of Ohio, the president
of Kent State University, and members of the Ohio State National Guard).
109. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 322 (1975).
110. O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563, 576-77 (1975).
111. Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 561 (1978).
112. The good faith affirmative defense may not be available against a claim
for equitable relief. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 315 n.6 (1975) ("immunity
from damages does not ordinarily bar equitable relief as well"). See, e.g., Fowler
v. Alexander, 478 F.2d 694, 696 (4th Cir. 1973); Rud v. Dahl, 578 F.2d 674, 676
(7th Cir. 1978); Shipp v. Todd, 568 F.2d 133, 134 (9th Cir. 1978).
113. 365 U.S. at 187.
114. Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. at 556-57.
115. In post-Pierson cases, the Court seems to have abandoned its search for a
common law tort background which would justify creating a good faith affir-
mative defense to § 1983. See Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555, 568 n.3
(1978) (Stevens, J., dissenting) (creating a good faith affirmative defense for
prison officials); O'Connor v. Donaldson, 422 U.S. 563 (1975) (creating a good
faith affirmative defense for mental hospital superintendents). But see Owen v.
City of Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 1412-15 (1980) (common law tort im-
munities of municipalities examined).
116. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. at 320.
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the threat of money damages liability might interfere with a public
official's exercise of an unintimated, unfettered discretion;" 7 and (3) there
is "the injustice, particularly in the absence of bad faith, of subjecting to
liability an officer who is required, by the legal obligations of his position,
to exercise discretion."11 s
To determine the availability of a good faith affirmative defense, the
trial court must decide that the defendant is a public official who possesses
discretionary decision-making power and that the act complained of is an
exercise of that official's discretionary power." 9 Once the availability of
the defense is established, the defendant has the burden of pleading, pro-
duction, and possibly the burden of persuasion 20 to show (1) that the
defendant-official subjectively was "acting sincerely and with a belief that
he ... [was] doing right"'121 and (2) that the defendant-official's belief that
he was doing right was objectively reasonable. 22 The plaintiff may try to
thwart the official's good faith affirmative defense by showing that the de-
fendant-official "knew or reasonably should have known that the action he
took within his sphere of official responsibility would violate the constitu-
tional rights of the ... [individuals] affected, or... [that the defendant-
official] took the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation
of constitutional rights or other injury."' 23
To date, no organizations have been given a section 1983 good faith af-
firmative defense. In Owen v. City of Independence, 124 the municipality of
Independence, Missouri, tried to establish a good faith affirmative defense
to a section 1983 claim by its former police chief that he had been dis-
charged without a hearing and notice in violation of the fourteenth
amendment. The Court held that the good faith affirmative defense was
unavailable to municipalities because neither the common law tradition
nor the policy considerations undergirding the section 1983 good faith af-
firmative defense justified the extension of the defense to municipalities.
117. Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. at 240. But the Court in Owen v. City of In-
dependence, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 1418 (1980), noted that state officials do not have
discretion with respect to compliance with applicable federal law.
118. 416 U.S. at 240..
119. See id. at 247. See also Procunier v. Navarette, 434 U.S. 555 (1978),
which indicates that acts of negligence might be negated by the good faith affir-
mative defense, even though one of the elements of the defense is that the defen-
dant show that his conduct was objectively reasonable. This notion seems peculiar
since acts of negligence are by definition unreasonable.
120. See Gomez v. Toledo, 100 S. Ct. 1920 (1980). Justice Rehnquist reads
this case to require only the burdens of pleading and production to be borne by
the defendant. Id. at 1924 (Rehnquist, J., concurring).
121. Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. at 321.
122. See Gomez v. Toledo, 100 S. Ct. at 1924; Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S.
at 320-22.
123. 420 U.S. at 322.
124. 100 S. Ct. 1398 (1980).
394 [Vol. 46
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The first inquiry in Owen was whether municipalities had a qualified
immunity as part of the background of tort liability against which section
1983 must be read. The Court isolated two common law municipal tort
immunities. Traditionally, municipalities have had an immunity for "gov-
ernmental," as distinct from "proprietary," activity 25 and for "dis-
cretionary," as distinct from "ministerial," activity. 12 6
The Court found that the common law municipal immunity for
"governmental" activity did not justify the creation of a section 1983 good
faith affirmative defense. First, the Court concluded that the common law
immunity for governmental functions is comparable to an absolute im-
munity that defeats the suit at the outset rather than a qualified immunity
or good faith defense that depends on a finding of subjective goodfaith
after a trial on the merits. 127 Second, the Court stated:
[T]he municipality's "governmental" immunity is obviously
abrogated by the sovereign's enactment of a statute making it
amenable to suit. Section 1983 was just such a statute. By in-
cluding municipalities within the class of "persons" subject to lia-
bility for violations of the Federal Constitution and laws, Congress
-the supreme sovereign on matters of federal law-abolished
whatever vestige of the State's sovereign immunity the municipal-
ity possessed. 128
The Court also examined the municipality's common law immunity
for "discretionary" acts and found that this immunity was inapplicable
because the municipality's duty of conforming its activity to the require-
ments of federal law, as section 1983 requires, is not a discretionary act. 129
The Court examined the policy considerations supporting the good
faith affirmative defense for governmental officials and found that such
considerations did not justify extension of the defense to municipalities.
First, the Court found that the fear that the imposition of money damages
liability would deter the most qualified individuals from taking positions as
local government officials is "totally unwarranted ... once the threat of
personal liability is eliminated."130 Second, it concluded that the threat
125. Id. at 1412-14.
126. Id. at 1412, 1414-15.
127. Id. at 1413 n.29.
128. Id. at 1414 (footnote omitted). It is hard to reconcile this language with
the existence of any immunities under § 1983-absolute or qualified. Under this
language, it would appear that Congress abolished whatever vestige of common
law immunities that judges, legislators, prosecutors, policemen, state governors,
state university presidents, state National Guard members, state mental hospital
superintendents, and prison officials might have by making all "persons" acting
under color of state law potential defendants under the statute.
129. Id. at 1414-15.
130. Id. at 1417 n.38. The Court seems to ignore the argument that by sub-
jecting municipalities to damages, limited municipal resources are diverted from
the provisions of services into compensation for injuries, thus lessening the "quali-
ty" of the municipality.
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that individuals holding government posts would be deterred from exer-
cising their discretionary decision-making powers "is significantly
reduced, if not eliminated, ...when the threat of personal liability is
removed."'13 ' Third, the Court said there is no danger of unjustly imposing
money damages on a public official who acted in good faith when "the
damage award comes not from the official's pocket, but from the public
treasury."' 32 Rather, "the principle of equitable loss-spreading" justifies
allocating the cost of a constitutional or federal statutory deprivation to
the municipality and thus to the public at large. "[I]t is the public at large
which enjoys the benefits of the government's activities, and it is the public
at large which is ultimately responsible for its administration."', 33 Thus, it
is the public at large which should bear the costs of any constitutional or
federal statutory deprivations caused by the acts of municipal agents
which "may fairly be said to represent official policy.' 34
2. The Invidiously Discriminatory Animus Requirement
of Section 1985(3)
In Griffin v. Breckenridge, 35 the Court said that the section 1985(3)
language "requiring intent to deprive of equal protection, or equal
privileges and immunities, means that there must be some racial, or
perhaps otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus behind
the conspirator's action.' 3 6 The reason given for interpreting the word
"equal" as a mental state requirement is "[t]he constitutional shoals that
would lie in the path of interpreting § 1985(3) as a general federal tort
law."1
3 7
There are three parts in establishing this class-based, invidiously dis-
criminatory animus: (1) the defendant must commit a discriminatory act
against a class of persons protected by the statute; (2) the plaintiff must
have the proper relationship with the protected class; and (3) the in-
vidiously discriminatory animus must be established.138
131. Id. at 1418.
132. Id. at 1417.
133. Id. See also id. at 1419.
134. Id. at 1419 (quoting Monell, 436 U.S. at 694).
135. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
136. Id. at 102 (footnote omitted).
137. Id. It is unclear as to what "constitutional shoals" the Court was refer-
ring. There are at least two possibilities. First, there is the problem of reaching
private actors under the fourteenth amendment. Second, by requiring a mental
state, the Court might be avoiding an argument that § 1985(3) is unconstitu-
tionally vague. Cf Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) (construing the
criminal counterpart to § 1983 to require a specific intent to deprive another of
federal rights in order to avoid holding the statute unconstitutionally vague).
138. See Note, The Class-Based Animus Requirement of 4 U.S.C. §
1985(c): A Suggested Approach, 64 MINN. L. REV. 635, 641 (1979-1980). See
also Recent Developments, Civil Rights-Section 1985(3)-Students Attending
[Vol. 46396
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Grffin requires that the discriminatory animus be class-based. To date,
only racial classes have been given protection by the Supreme Court. 1 39 Never-
theless, racial classes probably were not the only ones intended to be protected
by section 1985(3).140 The Republican Congress that enacted the KKK Act was
concerned with the safety of fellow party members who were being harrassed
and killed by former Confederates in the South. 141 Therefore, politically based
classes might be included as protected classes under section 1985(3). 142 Because
lines of conflict during the Civil War period were drawn largely in terms of
North vs. South, classes based on geographical area also might have been in-
tended to be included within the protection of the statute. 143 Some lower courts
have included as protected such diverse classes as those based on sex,' 44
Private Educational Institutions May Sue School Administrators For Deprivation
of Equal Protection of the Laws and Equal Privileges and Immunities, 21 VILL.
L. REV. 928, 936 (1975-1976).
139. Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971).
140. The Select Committee of the Senate to Investigate Alleged Outrages in
the Southern States made a 600-page report detailing the activities of the Ku Klux
Klan and other terrorist organizations during the Reconstruction Period of the
South. Many of the victims of the outrages investigated were white. See S. REP.
No. 1, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. XIV-XXI (1871). This would indicate that race dis-
crimination was not the exclusive wrong that Congress attempted to remedy by
enacting the KKK Act.
141. "The dead and the wounded, the maimed and the scourged are all, all
Republicans." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 426 (1871) (remarks of Rep.
McKee). See also id. at 505 (remarks of Sen. Pratt), quoted in Monroe v. Pape,
365 U.S. at 178.
142. See, e.g., Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971) (employees
who advocate racial equality); Cameron v. Brock, 473 F.2d 608 (6th Cir. 1973)
(supporters of a political candidate); Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600 (7th
Cir. 1979) (Black Panther Party), modified, 100 S. Ct. 1987 (1980); Means v.
Wilson, 522 F.2d 833 (8th Cir.) (Indians with a political view), cert. denied, 424
U.S. 958 (1975); Puentes v. Sullivan, 425 F. Supp. 249 (W.D. Tex. 1977)
(political supporters). But see Rodgers v. Tolson, 582 F.2d 315 (4th Cir. 1978)
(political and philosophical opponents of town commissioners were not a pro-
tected class).
143. "[I]f ... it should appear that this conspiracy was formed against this
man because he was a Democrat .... or because he was a Catholic, or because he
was a Methodist, or because he was a Vermonter, . . . then this section could
reach it." CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 567 (1871) (remarks of Sen. Ed-
munds).
1.44. See, e.g., Novotny v. Great Am. Fed. Sav.& Loan Ass'n, 584 F.2d 1235
(3d Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366 (1979); Conroy v. Conroy,
575 F.2d 175 (8th Cir. 1978); Life Ins. Co. of N. America v. Reichardt, 591 F.2d
499 (9th Cir. 1979); Hodgin v. Jefferson, 447 F. Supp. 804 (D. Md. 1978); Curran
v. Portland Superintending School Comm'n, 435 F. Supp. 1063 (S.D. Me. 1977);
Beamon v. W.B. Saunders Co., 413 F. Supp. 1167 (E.D. Pa. 1976); Pendrell v.
Chatham College, 370 F. Supp. 494 (W.D. Pa. 1974); Stern v. Massachusetts In-
dem. & Life Ins. Co., 365 F. Supp. 433 (E.D. Pa. 1973). But see Jackson v.
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religion, 145 groups exercising first amendment rights,' 46environmentalists,141
and members of a white middle class family.148 Other courts have been unwill-
ing to extend protection under section 1985(3) to classes other than those based
on discrete insular minorities. 149 Probably the broadest interpretation of the
classes included under section 1985(3) would come from a literal reading of the
statutory language itself which states that the discriminatory purpose may run
to "any person or class of persons.' 'I50
Once it has been shown that the defendants acted against a class of
persons protected by section 1985(3), the proper relationship between the
plaintiff and the protected class must be established. If the plaintiff is a
Associated Hosp. Serv., 414 F. Supp. 315 (E.D. Pa. 1976) (pregnant women not
protected class), affd, 549 F.2d 795 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 434 U.S. 832 (1977).
145. See, e.g., Marlowe v. Fisher Body, 489 F.2d 1057 (6th Cir. 1973) (Jews);
Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (white Catholics); Baer v. Baer,
450 F. Supp. 481 (N.D. Cal. 1978) (followers of the Reverend Moon). See also
Mandelkorn v. Patrick, 359 F. Supp. 692 (D.D.C. 1973) (religious adherent of the
"Children of God" could state a claim under § 1985(3)).
146. See, e.g., Brown v. Villanova Univ., 378 F. Supp. 342 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
147. See, e.g., Westberry v. Gilman Paper Co., 507 F.2d 206, opinion with-
drawn, 507 F.2d 215 (5th Cir. 1975). But see Hughes v. Ranger Fuel Corp., 467
F.2d 6 (4th Cir. 1972) (environmentally concerned persons who were taking pic-
tures of a dump site, not a protected class).
148. See, e.g., Azar v. Conley, 456 F.2d 1382 (6th Cir. 1972).
149. See, e.g., Carchman v. Korman Corp., 594 F.2d 354 (3d Cir.) (tenant
organizers), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 898 (1979); Bova v. Pipefitters & Plumbers
Local 60, 554 F.2d 226 (5th Cir. 1977) (nonunion employees); McLellan v.
Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977) (bankrupts); Studen
v. Beebe, 588 F.2d 560 (6th Cir. 1978) (property owners); DeSantis v. Pacific Tel.
& Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327 (9th Cir. 1979) (homosexuals); Blevins v. Ford, 572 F.2d
1336 (9th Cir. 1978) (nonlawyers); Lessman v. McCormick, 591 F.2d 605 (10th
Cir. 1979) (debtors); Smith v. Yellow Freight System, Inc., 536 F.2d 1320 (10th
Cir. 1976) (truckdrivers). See generally Note, The Class-Based Animus Require-
ment of 42 U.S. C. § 1985(c): A Suggested Approach, 64 MINN. L. REV. 635
(1980).
150. Griffin's class-based motivation requirement that was implied from the
word "equal" in § 1985(3) seems to be inherently inconsistent with the language of
the statute which states that the conspiracy can be against "any person or class of
persons." Thus, courts have had difficulty in determining what is a class. See,
e.g., Bricker v. Crane, 468 F.2d 1228 (1st Cir. 1972) (class of one person cannot
exist), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 930 (1973); Hughes v. Ranger Fuel Corp., 467 F.2d
6 (4th Cir. 1972) (spontaneous act not part of general plan of discrimination can-
not be class-based); Sims v. Jefferson Downs, Inc., 611 F.2d 609 (5th Cir. 1980)
(class of one person cannot exist); Slavin v. Curry, 574 F.2d 1256 (5th Cir. 1978)
(class of one person cannot exist); Taylor v. Brighton Corp., 616 F.2d 256 (6th
Cir. 1980) (if all in class not discriminated against, no discriminatory animus);
Askew v. Bloemker, 548 F.2d 673 (7th Cir. 1976) (no common characteristics of
class before misconduct, no class); Potenza v. Schoessling, 541 F.2d 670 (7th Cir.
1976) (not all members discriminated against, no class-based discrimination).
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member of the protected class and is injured by the defendant's acts, then
no one would contend that the plaintiff is an improper plaintiff. Yet, sec-
tion 1985(3) may be even broader. It provides that when "one or more per-
sons engaged ... [in the conspiracy] do, or cause to be done, any act in fur-
therance of the object of such conspiracy, whereby another is injured...
the party so injured or deprived may have an action for the recovery of
damages ... ,,1 51 There is no requirement in the statute that the "other"
injured by the conspiracy be a member of the class discriminated against,
i.e., the statute gives a cause of action to anyone injured by acts in further-
ance of the conspiracy. Thus, if an innocent bystander or an advocate of
the protected class' rights is injured by an act in furtherance of the con-
spiracy, then he may have a cause of action under section 1985(3). In
Novotny v. Great American Federal Savings & Loan Association, 52 the
plaintiff was a male officer and director of the defendant-savings and loan.
The plaintiff alleged that the defendant-officers and directors "'intention-
ally and deliberately embarked upon and pursued a course of conduct the
effect of which was to deny female employees equal employment oppor-
tunity' ,,163 in violation of section 601 of Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of
1964.154 After advocating equal employment opportunities for women in
the corporation, the plaintiff was fired. He alleged his termination was a
result of his advocacy. The court held that although the discrimination
was against women, the male plaintiff was injured because of the con-
spiracy and thus stated a cause of action under section 1985(3).
The last step in establishing the mental state requirement is to show
the invidiously discriminatory animus behind the conspiracy. In Griffin v.
Breckenridge,15 5 the Court stated that the "motivation requirement in-
troduced by the word 'equal' into ... § 1985(3) ... must not be confused
with"'15 6 the specific intent requirement for 18 U.S.C. § 242,157 created in
Screws v. United States.158 In Screws, the Court was confronted with the
criminal counterpart to section 1983, which had formerly been section 2 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1866.159 To avoid a vagueness challenge to section
242, the Court interpreted the word "willfully" in the statute to require "a
specific intent to deprive a person of a federal right."160
151. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. III 1979) (emphasis added).
152. 584 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1978), vacated on other grounds, 442 U.S. 366
(1979). See also Richardson v. Miller, 446 F.2d 1247 (3d Cir. 1971).
153. 584 F.2d at 1237.
154. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1976).
155. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
156. Id. at 102 n.10.
157. (1976).
158. 325 U.S. 91 (1945).
159. Ch. 31, 14 Stat. 27 (current version at 18 U.S.C. § 242 (1976)). For a
discussion of the history of the Act, see note 2 supra.
160. 325 U.S. at 103.
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Grzffin, in distinguishing the mental state requirement of section
1985(3) from that of section 242 stated, "[T]he motivation aspect of §
1985(3) focuses not on scienter in relation to deprivation of rights but on
invidious discriminatory animus."'' 6' The Court may have meant that the
invidiously discriminatory animus requirement of section 1985(3) focuses
only on the use of a "bad" or invidious criteria, e.g., race, sex, religious
affiliation, and not on an intent to deprive a person of a federal right.
Thus, one does not have to know that one is depriving another of equal
protection of the laws or equal privileges and immunities under the law; all
that is required is the use of an invidious or improper criteria in making a
decision or committing the complained of conduct.
In Washington v. Davis, 6 2 the Court read into the fourteenth amend-
ment an invidiously discriminatory purpose mental state requirement; a
requirement that may be the equivalent of the invidiously discriminatory
animus requirement in section 1985(3). The invidiously discriminatory
purpose of the fourteenth amendment's equal protection clause does not
have to be the sole motivating force behind the complained of conduct. ' 61
The invidiously discriminatory purpose requirement is directed only to
public organizations or other state actors under the fourteenth amend-
ment; section 1985(3) applies to both state and private actors. Neverthe-
less, many business entities have a group decision-making process that is
similar to the operation of the local governmental unit described in Village
of Arlington Heights. "Rarely can it be said that" a business concern or a
municipality "was motivated solely by a single concern, or even that a par-
ticular purpose was the 'dominant' or 'primary' one."' 64 If this analogy be-
tween the fourteenth amendment and section 1985(3) is valid, then all that
may be necessary to show the invidiously discriminatory animus required
by section 1985(3) is that the "discriminatory purpose has been a
motivating factor" in the decision-making process, even though the dis-
criminatory purpose is not the dominant or primary purpose. 6 '
Village of Arlington Heights elaborates on the types of evidence to be
used in establishing the invidiously discriminatory purpose necessary to
show a nonfacial violation of the equal protection clause of the fourteenth
amendment. "Determining whether invidious discriminatory purpose was
a motivating factor demands a sensitive inquiry into such circumstantial
and direct evidence of intent as may be available.' 66 A nonexhaustive list
of relevant factors includes (1) "[t]he historical background of the
decision"; (2) the specific sequence of events leading up to the challenged
161. 403 U.S. at 102 n.10.
162. 426 U.S. 229 (1976).
163. Village of Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Dev. Corp., 429
U.S. 252, 265-66 (1977).
164. Id. at 265.
165. Id. at 265-66 (emphasis added).
166. Id. at 266.
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decision; (3) departures from the normal procedural sequence; and (4)
contemporary statements by members of the decision-making body,
minutes of its meetings, or reports. 67
The invidiously discriminatory animus requirement of section 1985(3)
may create an insurmountable problem in establishing private or public
organizational liability under the statute. Because corporations are fic-
tional entities incapable of possessing a mental state, invidiously discrimi-
natory or otherwise, a method must be developed to impute the mental
state of corporate officials to the corporation. One might be able to use
either the vicarious or identification theory to do this. 68
C. Causation
1. The Vicarious Liability and Systematic Maladministration
Problems under Section 1983
In Rizzo v. Goode, 69 plaintiffs, who were victims of past unconstitu-
tional conduct by lower-level Philadelphia police officers, brought a class
action against high-ranking municipal and police department officials
praying for equitable relief to stop the allegedly unconstitutional activity
of the lower-level police officers. After hearing a "staggering amount of
evidence," the district court found the existence of a persistent pattern of
constitutional violations on the part of the lower-level Philadelphia police-
men and that this pattern was likely to continue. 70 The district court used
its equitable powers to remedy this persistent pattern of constitutional
violations by forcing the defendant-supervisory officials to create a system
for handling civilian complaints of police misconduct.
The Supreme Court might have reversed on the ground that this pat-
tern of unconstitutional conduct did not show a custom or usage that has
the force and effect of law under Adickes,' 7 1 but, instead, reversed on a
causation rationale. 72 The Court characterized the plaintiffs theory as
167. Id. at 267-68.
168. For a discussion of methods of imputing a mental state to an organiza-
tion, see. text accompanying notes 70-78 supra.
169. 423 U.S. 362 (1976). See Note, Rizzo v. Goode: The Burger Court's Con-
tinuing Assault on Federal Jurisdiction, 30 RUTGERS L. REV. 103 (1976); Note,
Rizzo v. Goode: Federal Remedies For Police Misconduct, 62 VA. L. REV. 1259
(1976).
170. 423 U.S. at 367-69.
171. 398 U.S. 144 (1970). It is unclear whether a persistent pattern of police
misconduct is a custom of the state that has the force of law. See text accompany-
ing notes 40-43 supra.
172. The Court gave three reasons for reversing the lower court. First, there
was doubt as to plaintiffs' standing. 423 U.S. at 371-73. Second, the Court
created a commission/omission limitation on causation under § 1983. Id. at
373-77. Third, the Court indicated that, because of principles of federalism, the
equitable powers of the federal courts do not extend so far as to impose on state
officials the duty of maintaining a citizen complaint procedure. Id. at 377-80.
1981]
31
Gebhardt: Gebhardt: Survey of Organizational and Supervisory Liability
Published by University of Missouri School of Law Scholarship Repository, 1981
MISSOURI LAW REVIEW
positing "a constitutional 'duty' on the part of... [defendant-supervisory
officials] to 'eliminate' future police misconduct," and "a 'default' of that
affirmative duty ... [was] shown by the statistical pattern." 173 The Court
rejected this theory by creating a commission-omission dichotomy in sec-
tion 1983 law. Some affirmative act on the part of the defendant-state of-
ficials was necessary to show the required causal link; passive indifference
on the part of supervisory state officials who had the authority and ability
to stop the pattern of unconstitutional activity was not enough to satisfy
the causation requirement of section 1983.174
This commission-omission limitation on the causation element of sec-
tion 1983 puts a kink in a lawsuit whose purpose is to provide prospective
relief from some systematic defect in the administration of a public agency
or organization. This is ironic in that one of the avowed purposes of the
KKK Act was to remedy the systematic maladministration of the laws by
state officials.175 Under Rizzo, the problem is creating the "duty" on the
part of the supervisory state officials to stop the pattern of unconstitutional
behavior by lower-level employees. This duty may have to be found in the
Constitution. In Estelle v. Gamble,176 an inmate in a Texas prison brought
a section 1983 action for damages against the Director of the Department
of Corrections, the Warden of the prison, and the Medical Director of the
Department of Corrections, all of whom were supervisory state officials,
alleging the failure of these prison officials to provide medical care to the
prisoner in violation of the eighth amendment's prohibition of cruel and
unusual punishment as incorporated into the fourteenth. The Supreme
Court found that the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment created
a duty on the part of the government to provide medical care, because
when a state incarcerates a person, the state denies that person the liberty
of seeking and securing medical attention for himself. Thus, if the state
does not provide some minimal level of medical care, the inmate's medical
needs will not be met and physical pain and suffering will result creating a
violation of the prohibition of cruel and unusual punishment.
The Court in Gamble indicated, however, that not every delict in the
provision of the minimal standard of medical care would result in the im-
position of damages. The plaintiff must show the defendant-prison of-
ficials acted in deliberate indifference to serious medical needs. The Court
stated that this deliberate indifference state of mind could be shown to ex-
ist if lower-level prison employees intentionally denied, delayed, or in-
terfered with the prisoner's medical treatment and no action was taken by
the supervisory employees in charge. 7
173. Id. at 376.
174. Id.
175. See remarks of Representative Garfield, note 43 supra.
176. 429 U.S. 97 (1976).
177. Id. at 104-05.
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In Rizzo, one might have been able to show this mental state of
deliberate indifference on the part of some supervisory officials by showing
that the intentional acts of misconduct by the lower-echelon policemen
were made known to these supervisory officials and nothing was done to
prevent future misconduct.17 8 It would be interesting to see if this mental
state of deliberate indifference could substitute for an act of commission
under section 1983.179 If a supervisory official is not passively allowing
lower-level employee misconduct to occur, but is allowing this conduct to
occur through deliberate indifference, then it may be possible that a suffi-
cient causal link is established between the supervisory official's indif-
ference and the acts of the lower-level employees subject to his supervision.
The second limitation on the causation element of section 1983 comes
from Monell v. Department of Social Services. 18 0 In Monell, after holding
that municipalities as well as school boards are "persons" under section
1983, the Court, in dicta,' 8 ' limited the use of vicarious liability theories,
including the respondeat superior doctrine, against municipalities. A
municipality, or other public organization, may be held liable only when
the acts of municipal agents "mayfairly be said to represent official policy"
of the municipality. 8 2 This result rests on three propositions. First,
because section 1983 has the word "cause" explicitly in the statute, the use
of any vicarious liability theory is precluded; by definition a vicarious
liability theory does not include a causation requirement. 83 Second, the
178. 423 U.S. at 382 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (by implication).
179. The Court in Rizzo had to eviscerate Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939), and Allee v. Medrano, 416 U.S. 802 (1974), to reach its result. These cases
indicated that federal courts had the equitable power to enjoin supervisory of-
ficials if there were a persistent pattern of misconduct by the supervisory official's
subordinates. Rizzo indicates that only a supervisory official who intentionally
fails to correct the misconduct of his subordinates would fall under Allee's rule
allowing the equitable relief. Since Rizzo distinguishes Allee by stating that in
Allee there was an intentional failure to act, could a showing of deliberate indif-
ference put the facts under Allee?
180. 436 U.S. 658 (1978).
181. Justice Stevens pointed out that the limitation on the use of vicarious
liability was not necessary for the Court's conclusion and is technically dicta. Id.
at 714 (Stevens, J., concurring).
182. Id. at 694 (emphasis added).
183. The Court looked at the "subjects, or cause to be subjected" language of
§ 1983 and stated that "the fact that Congress did specifically provide that A's tort
became B's liability if B 'caused' A to subject another to a tort suggests that Con-
gress did not intend § 1983 liability to attach where such causation was absent."
Id. at 692 (citation omitted). The Court seems to ignore the disjunctive "or" be-
tween "subjects" and "cause to be subjected" in § 1983. By ignoring the "or," the
Court indicates that a municipality cannot "subject" another to a constitutional
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use of "respondeat superior would have raised all the constitutional prob-
lems associated with the obligation to keep the peace, an obligation Con-
gress chose not to impose because it thought imposition of such an obliga-
tion unconstitutional. 1 84 Third, the traditional justifications for the crea-
tion of the respondeat superior doctrine, i.e., a deterrence theory' 85 and
an insurance theory, 8 6 were implicitly rejected by Congress in its rejection
of the Sherman Amendment.
Thus, under the rationale in Monell a state custom or policy that is ac-
tionable under section 1983 must be made by a "policymaker." It remains
to be seen if there is a principled way of distinguishing policymakers from
nonpolicymakers, or how the Court will make this distinction.'87 Because
of this limitation on the causation requirement in section 1983, at least one
commentator has recommended trying to imply a cause of action against
municipalities directly from the fourteenth amendment under a Bivens-
type theory. 188 Ironically, one of the reasons given in Monell for overruling
Monroe's holding, i.e., a municipality was not a "person" for purposes of
section 1983, was to avoid the constitutional question whether one could
imply a cause of action from the fourteenth amendment against a
municipality. 189
2. Causation under Section 1985(3): A Hypothetical
Section 1985(3) Analysis
Section 1985(3) has an "overt act" causation requirement. To help
clarify the rather intricate workings of causation under section 1985(3), an
example will be given. For purposes of analysis, the example assumes the
facts in the Rizzo case where lower-echelon policemen were engaged in
police misconduct. In order to state a claim under section 1985(3), the
plaintiff first must show that these policemen were legally capable of con-
spiring. It could be argued under Dombrowski that these policemen can-
not conspire because they were all agents acting within the scope of their
employment and thus there was only a single legal entity involved.1 0 The
police misconduct may, however, fit one of the exceptions to the Dom-
184. 436 U.S. at 693. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 804 (1871)
(remarks of Rep. Poland), quoted in Monell v. Department of Social Servs., 436
U.S. at 664; Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 190. See also notes 10-17 and accompa-
nying text supra.
185. 436 U.S. at 693.
186. Id. at 693-94. Cf. Owenv. City of Independence, 100 S. Ct. 1398, 1419
(1980) ("the principle of equitable loss-spreading has joined fault as a factor in
distributing costs of official misconduct").
187. See notes 73-78 and accompanying text supra.
188. Comment, Respondeat Superior Liability of Municipalities for Con-
stitutional Torts After Monell: New Remedies to Pursue?, 44 Mo. L. REv. 514,
537-48 (1979).
189. Monell, 436 U.S. at 712 (Powell, J., concurring).
190. See text accompanying note 58 supra.,
[Vol. 46
34
Missouri Law Review, Vol. 46, Iss. 2 [1981], Art. 4
https://scholarship.law.missouri.edu/mlr/vol46/iss2/4
CIVIL RIGHTS LEGISLATION
browski rule. Rizzo was a class action in which about forty incidents of
police misconduct were shown; thus, the multiple acts exception to the
Dombrowski rule might apply.' 9' In Rizzo, there were cases of police
misconduct of a violent nature, such as beatings and unlawful arrests;' 92
thus, the violent acts exception might apply.'93 It also could be argued that
the policemen in Rizzo were engaged in conduct which the police depart-
ment had prohibited and, thus, were acting outside the scope of their
authority. This would be true especially if the police department had dis-
ciplinary procedures for the kind of police misconduct that occurred; thus,
the acting outside the scope of agency exception might apply. 194
The second element the plaintiff must show is that the policemen did
in fact conspire. An agreement to engage in unlawful conduct can be in-
ferred from behavior. 195 If the policemen were engaged in joint unlawful
conduct similar to that in Rizzo, a jury question could be raised as to the
existence of an unlawful agreement or understanding.
The third element that the plaintiff must prove is that there is an
invidiously discriminatory animus motivating the conspiracy of the police
officers.'96 In Rizzo, race was a factor in the police misconduct.197 If race is
a motivating factor, then the invidiously discriminatory animus may exist
because racial classes are protected under section 1985(3). 19
The fourth element that the plaintiff must show is that the defendant
deprived the plaintiff of the equal protection of the laws or equal privileges
and immunities under the laws. 199 In Rizzo, the lower-level policemen
were engaged in an unusually high incidence of federal constitutional
violations. Federal constitutional rights may be privileges and immunities
under the laws within the meaning of section 1985(3).1 00
The fifth element the plaintiff must show in a section 1985(3) claim is
191. See Jackson v. University of Pittsburgh, 405 F. Supp. 607, 612-13 (W.D.
Pa. 1975); Rackin v. University of Pa., 386 F. Supp. 992, 1005-06 (E.D. Pa.
1974).
192. See generally COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1973),
affd, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976).
193. See Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190, 196 (7th Cir. 1972). But see
Cole v. University of Hartford, 391 F. Supp. 888, 893 (D. Conn. 1975).
194. See Girard v. 94th St. & Fifth Ave. Corp., 530 F.2d 66, 71 (2d Cir.),
cert. denied, 425 U.S. 974 (1976).
195. See, e.g., Hampton v. Hanrahan, 600 F.2d 600, 621 (7th Cir. 1979).
196. See notes 135-68 and accompanying text supra.
197. See generally COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289 (E.D. Pa. 1973),
affd, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. 362
(1976).
198. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971). See also notes
135-68 and accompanying text supra.
199. See notes 237-75 and accompanying text infra.
200. See text accompanying note 275 infra.
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that there is some power under the Constitution by which Congress can
reach the defendants.20 1 Since policemen are state actors, the section 5
power under the fourteenth amendment is available to reach these defen-
dants.
The sixth element that the plaintiff must prove is that there was an
overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy, 20 2 and that the overt act caused
injury to plaintiffs person or property, or that the plaintiff was "deprived
of having and exercising any right or privilege of a citizen of the United
States." 203 Once one shows an overt act in furtherance of the conspiracy,
liability is imposed on all co-conspirators, not just on the conspirator who
acted. Thus, if the supervisory officials in Rizzo were parties to the section
1985(3) agreement, 20 4 they would be subject to liability.
Alternatively, if one cannot show that any supervisory or policy-
making official was a party to the conspiracy, then the supervisory or pol-
icymaking official might be liable under section 1986205 if the plaintiff
shows the following two elements: (1) that the defendant-supervisory of-
ficial knew that injury from the section 1985(3) conspiracy of the lower-
level policemen was about to occur and (2) that the supervisory official had
the ability to prevent or to aid in the prevention of the wrongs committed
by the section 1985 conspiracy. In Rizzo, knowledge of future con-
spiratorial misconduct of lower-level employees might be shown in that
some complaints about the misbehaving lower-level employees did reach
the supervisory officials. 20 6 AsJustice Blackmun observed in Rizzo, it could
be inferred that lower-level police misconduct would continue unless
abated by these supervisory officials.20 7 Thus, if the supervisory official
does nothing to prevent future misconduct, that official "knows" that
wrongs prohibited by section 1985(3) are about to be committed. The
supervisory officials in Rizzo also had the ability to prevent or to aid in
preventing the misconduct by employees subject to their supervisory con-
201. See text accompanying notes 47-56 supra.
202. Collins v. Hardyman, 341 U.S. 651, 659 (1951) (limited in Griffin v.
Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971)).
203. 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. III 1979). It is unclear what the rights or
privileges of a United States citizen are. Nevertheless, if there is no damage to the
plaintiffs person or property, then the monetary value of whatever rights are en-
compassed by this language probably is nominal. See generally Carey v. Piphus,
435 U.S. 247 (1978).
204. See text accompanying notes 70-78 supra.
205. 42 U.S.C. § 1986 (1976). See note 12 supra.
206. COPPAR v. Rizzo, 357 F. Supp. 1289, 1299-1300 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(mother of a 16-year-old boy who had been beaten tried to make out a
complaint), affd, 506 F.2d 542 (3d Cir. 1974), rev'd sub nom. Rizzo v. Goode,
423 U.S. 362 (1976); id. at 1316 (woman who witnessed black youth's head being
banged repeatedly against sidewalk tried to make out complaint against the
police officer).
207. Rizzo v. Goode, 423 U.S. at 382 (Blackmun, J., dissenting).
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trol. Passive failure to act, in these circumstances, could give rise to money
damages liability under section 1986.
D. Interests or Norms Protected
1. Interests Encompassed by Section 1983
In Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization,20 8 the Court
held that section 1983 creates no substantive rights of its own but is merely
a statute providing a remedy for the violation of other substantive federal
rights. For a claim to lie, there must be a "deprivation" of "any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws."
20 9
Since section 1983 was enacted pursuant to the enforcement clause of
the fourteenth amendment to enforce its provisions, 210 section 1983's
reference to the "Constitution" probably encompasses all the rights
enumerated in the fourteenth amendment and all rights incorporated or
implied from the due process clause of the fourteenth amendment.
2
"
It is not clear whether parts of the Constitution which have not been
incorporated into the fourteenth amendment are included in section
1983's reference to the "Constitution." Since the statutory language en-
compasses "any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitu-
tion," the statute may have been intended to encompass all rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution. 21 2 A more serious
208. 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
209. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (Supp. III 1979).
210. For title to KKK Act, see note 1 supra.
211. See, e.g., Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969) (incorporating the
5th amendment prohibition on double jeopardy into the 14th amendment due
process clause); Malloy v. Hogan, 378 U.S. 1 (1964) (5th amendment prohibition
on coerced self-incrimination); Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963) (6th
amendment right to assistance of counsel); Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660
(1962) (8th amendment prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment); NAACP
v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958) (nonenumerated constitutional right of
assembly or association); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949) (4th amendment
prohibition of unreasonable searches and seizures); Everson v. Board of Educ.,
330 U.S. 1 (1947) (lst amendment prohibition of state establishment of religion);
Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296 (1940) (1st amendment right of the exer-
cise of freedom of religion); Near v. Minnesota, 283 U.S. 697 (1931) (1st amend-
ment right to free press); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1925) (1st amend-
ment right to free speech); Chicago, B. & Q. R.R. v. Chicago, 166 U.S. 226
(1897) (5th amendment right to just compensation).
212. It can be argued that, because the Forty-Second Congress enacted the
KKK Act to enforce the newly ratified fourteenth amendment, see note 1 supra, it
intended only that amendment to be encompassed within the word "Constitu-
tion." The Court in interpreting 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1976), a statute providing
criminal sanctions for the infringement of "the free exercise or enjoyment of any
right or privilege secured ... by the Constitution or laws of the United States,"
however, found that "its language embraces all of the rights and privileges
secured to citizens by all of the Constitution and all of the laws of the United
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question is whether Congress has the power to enforce those parts of the
Constitution which have not been incorporated into the fourteenth
amendment through a statute intended to enforce the fourteenth amend-
ment. 213
It may be that the supremacy clause is not part of the Constitution for
purposes of section 1983. If state law came into conflict with federal
statutory law, the supremacy clause would normally secure to a plaintiff all
his federal statutory rights. If the words "and laws" of section 1983 refer
only to federal statutory law, then that phrase would be meaningless sur-
plusage because a plaintiff would already have secured to him all federal
statutory rights through the supremacy clause. Therefore, to put meaning
into all the language in section 1983, the Court might read the supremacy
clause out of the Constitution for purposes of section 1983.214 In addition,
because the supremacy clause has not been incorporated into the four-
teenth amendment, section 1983 may be unavailable to remedy violations
of this part of the Constitution. 215
There may be considerable overlap, however, between rights
"secured" by the supremacy clause and rights encompassed by the "and
laws" language of section 1983. In Maine v. Thiboutot,21 6 the Court held
that the words "and laws" in section 1983 refer to all federal statutory law.
This holding was supported by two propositions. First, the absence of any
modifiers to the word "laws" allows the plain meaning of the statute to in-
clude all federal statutory law. 21 7 Second, the Court's earlier decisions ex-
plicitly or implicitly suggest that the section 1983 remedy broadly encom-
passes violations of all federal statutory rights. 218
Justice Powell, writing for the dissent in Thiboutot, argued that the
plain meaning rule of statutory construction is not applicable here because
the words "and laws" have no plain meaning. "[A] natural reading of the
conjunctive 'and' in § 1983 would require that the right at issue be secured
by both the Constitution and by the laws." 219 Justice Powell also argued
that the Court's earlier decisions impliedly allowing a section 1983 suit for
the violation of a federal statutory right never explicitly discussed the
meaning of the words "and laws" and because of this lack of thoughtful
discussion on the matter these earlier cases are poor authority and should
States." United States v. Price, 383 U.S. 787, 800 (1966) (emphasis added). See
also id. at 801.
213. See Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
214. See Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600,
612-15 (1979) (construing 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (Supp. III 1979), the jurisdic-
tional counterpart to § 1983).
215. See text accompanying notes 212 & 213 supra.
216. 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).
217. Id. at 2504.
218. For the cases cited by the majority supporting the proposition that a §
1983 claim lies for violation of federal statutes, see id. at 2504-05.
219. Id. at 2508 n.1 (Powell, J., dissenting) (emphasis added).
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not be relied on.220 Justice Powell further argued that when Congress re-
vised section 1 of the KKK Act in 1874, by adding the words "and laws" to
the statute, it did not intend the addition of these words to, refer to
anything but federal civil rights statutes affecting equal rights. 221
Justice Powell's most poignant attack on the majority focused on the
potential adverse effect created by the greatly expanded liability of state
government and state officials through inclusion of all federal statutory
law within the ambit of section 1983. Justice Powell argued that any time
there is a federal statute that is administered in a cooperative fashion by
the states there is the possibility that federal statutory rights will be
violated by persons acting "under color of state law." These state adminis-
trators now may be subject to liability under section 1983 for any federal
statutory violations they cause. 222
Because of Maine v. Thiboutot's expansion of liability under section
1983, one may encounter attempts to limit liability in the future. For ex-
ample, this expansion of liability may induce the Court to choose a
negligence, rather than a strict liability, mental state requirement when it
decides the standard of care that the plaintiff must plead and prove in a
section 1983 action. 223 Another way that Thiboutot may be limited in the
future is through emphasis of the remedial nature of section 1983. Both
section 1983 and section 1985(3) are considered by the Court to be
remedial in nature, i.e., the statutes create no substantive rights. 224 If the
federal statute that creates the substantive right also provides its own
remedy, there is the possibility that the Court will hold that the remedy in
the substantive federal statute precludes use of the section 1983 remedy.
220. Id. at 2515 (Powell, J., dissenting).
221. Id. at 2512-13 (Powell, J., dissenting). Justice Powell argued that § 1983
and its jurisdictional counterpart, 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (Supp. 111979), should
have the same scope, i.e., the "and laws" language of § 1983 was intended to refer
only to civil rights statutes providing for equal rights. See generally Chapman v.
Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600 (1979); text accompanying
notes 295-303 infra. For the history of the KKK Act, see note 1 supra.
222. 100 S. Ct. at 2513-14 (Powell, J., dissenting). See also id. at 2519-20
app. (Powell, J., dissenting).
223. It might be argued that holding a public official strictly liable for the
violation of all constitutional rights and all federal statutory rights of persons af-
fected by his decisions puts such an onerous burden on the official that it should
be necessary to show that the official acted negligently before a § 1983 claim can
lie. See notes 101-05 and accompanying text supra. This problem may be illusory,
however, because most public officials will have available to them a qualified im-
munity or good faith affirmative defense. See notes 106-34 and accompanying
text supra.
224. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372 (1979)
(§ 1985(3)); Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S. 600,
617 (1979) (§ 1983). Ironically, § 1983 and § 1985(3) were made remedial so that
they would be construed liberally. See CONG. GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. app.
68 (1871) (remarks of Rep. Shellabarger).
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An example of this can be seen in the section 1985(3) context in Great
American Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny. 221 In Novotny,
the plaintiff argued that Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 created a
substantive right to be free of sex discrimination in employment and that
this right is a privilege and immunity under the law within the scope of sec-
tion 1985(3). The Court held that Title VII rights are not encompassed
within those interests protected by section 1985(3), because to allow plain-
tiffs to bring an action under section 1985(3) for the violation of those
rights would undermine the federal administrative scheme that Congress
had created to enforce Title VII.226
Looking to the remedial scheme provided by the statute creating
substantive rights to determine whether those substantive rights may be
remedied by section 1983 or section 1985(3) may lead to some ironic
results. If the federal statute creating substantive rights has its own admin-
istrative procedures to remedy violations, then the section 1983 remedy
may be precluded by the remedies found in the federal statute creating the
substantive rights. On the other hand, if the federal statute that creates the
substantive rights does not provide a remedy, the section 1983 remedy is
not precluded. Thus, where Congress did intend to provide a remedy by
creating an administrative procedure for violations of the substantive
right, the section 1983 remedy is precluded under the rationale in Novot-
ny. But where Congress did not provide a remedy, and even if Congress in-
tended that there be no remedy, then the section 1983 remedy exists under
Maine v. Thiboutot.
An interesting issue that may arise after Maine v. Thiboutot is whether
the second statute that creates the substantive right that is the basis of the
section 1983 action can be used to reach private parties. In United States v.
Johnson,227 the issue was whether 18 U.S.C. § 241,228 which provides
criminal penalties for conspiracies "to injure, oppress, threaten, or in-
timidate any citizen in the free exercise or enjoyment of any right or privi-
lege secured to him by the Constitution or laws of the United States, '229
provided a cause of action against persons who prevented blacks from ex-
ercising their right to equality of public accommodations under Title II of
the Civil Rights Act of 1964. Title II, on its face, provides only equitable
relief and states that "[t]he remedies provided in this subchapter shall be
the exclusive means of enforcing the rights based on this subchapter." 230
The Court held that Title II created a substantive right secured by a law of
the United States; thus, injuring a citizen in the exercise of this right was a
violation of section 241 and a criminal remedy was available, even though
Title II provides an exclusive equitable remedy.
225. 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
226. Id. at 375-76.
227. 390 U.S. 563 (1968).
228. (1976).
229. 18 U.S.C. § 241 (1976) (emphasis added).
230. 42 U.S.C. § 2000a-6(b) (1976) (emphasis added).
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There are at least two problems in applying theJohnson analysis to sec-
tion 1983. First, if one uses two federal statutes to create a cause of action
against private actors, one statute to create the substantive right and sec-
tion 1983 to create the remedy, one may need to have two constitutional
sources of power that reach private parties. Section 1983 was enacted pur-
suant to the enforcement power under the fourteenth amendment, which
may not reach private parties'. In Griffin v. Breckenridge,231 however, the
Court searched elsewhere for a constitutional premise that would support
a section 1985(3) claim against private actors. 232 Since the Court allowed
the plaintiff in Griffin to sift through the Constitution for an appropriate
power that reached private parties under section 1985(3), one could argue
that the same process should be adopted with respect to section 1983
claims because section 1983 and section 1985(3) both derive from the KKK
Act. 233
The second problem in applying the Johnson analysis is the section
1983 requirement that the defendant act "under color of" state law.
Although the "under color of" state law requirement has been applied as
though it were co-extensive with the state action requirement of the four-
teenth amendment,23 4 it may be possible to act "under color of" state law
and not be a state actor for purposes of the fourteenth amendment. In
Flagg Brothers v. Brooks,23 5 a creditor acted pursuant to a New York state
statute in repossessing a debtor's property. The Court held that the
creditor was not a state actor for purposes of the fourteenth amendment.
Here the creditor was acting pursuant to state statute, i.e., under color of
state statute, but was not a state actor under the fourteenth amendment. It
could be argued that a corporation that exists by virtue of state incorpora-
tion laws and is subject to regulation by a state is acting "under color of'
state law, although such an organization may not be a state actor for pur-
poses of the fourteenth amendment. 236
2. Interests Encompassed by Section 1985(3)
The heart of section 1985(3) is the requirement that the conspirators,
or those engaged in the proscribed, disguised activity, act for the purpose
of depriving another of the equal protection of the laws or the equal
privileges and immunities under the laws. These words remain vague and
231. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
232. See text accompanying notes 49-56 supra.
233. See note 171 supra.
234. See text accompanying note 35 supra.
235. 436 U.S. 149 (1978).
236. See, e.g., Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 350 (1974)
("The mere fact that a business is subject to state regulation does not by itself con-
vert its action into that of the State for purposes of the Fourteenth
Amendment."); Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818, 824 (7th Cir.
1975) (holding that not every corporation is a state actor for purposes of the four-
teenth amendment merely because it is incorporated under state law), cert.
denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976).
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ill-defined, although over one hundred years have elapsed since the enact-
ment of the KKK Act.
A common element in the "equal protection of the laws" and "equal
privileges and immunities under the laws" language of section 1985(3) is
the word "equal." It is possible to interpret the word "equal" as a limita-
tion on the types of interests protected by section 1985(3) as has been done
in the section 1983 context. In Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Or-
ganization,23 7 the jurisdictional counterpart of section 1983, 28 U.S.C. §
1343(a)(3), 23 8 was limited through the use of the word "equal." Section
1343(a)(3) gives district courts jurisdiction to redress deprivations made
"under color of" state law of rights secured by the Constitution or "any Act
of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of all persons within the
jurisdiction of the United States." Those federal acts which provide for
"equal rights" were interpreted to include only federal civil rights
statutes.
2 9
Limiting the types of interests protected by section 1985(3) through its
use of the word "equal" may be unjustified. In Griffin v. Breckenridge,2' 0
the word "equal" was interpreted to require an invidiously discriminatory
mental state. 24' To require the same word to be both a mental state re-
quirement and a limitation on the types of interests encompassed would
unjustifiably burden this single word. For this reason the word "equal" in
section 1985(3) should be interpreted as a mental state requirement only.
a. Equal Protection of the Laws
Section 1985(3)'s equal protection clause is similar to that of the four-
teenth amendment except for one significant difference; section 1985(3)
has no state action requirement. Although it is difficult to understand a
denial of equal protection of the laws without state action, 242 the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit has adopted an independent
illegality test for violations of section 1985(3)'s equal protection clause by
private actors. 243
The source of the independent illegality test is United States v.
Harris,244 where it was stated:
A private person cannot make constitutions or laws, nor can he
with authority construe them, nor can he administer or execute
them. The only way, therefore, in which a private person can
237. 441 U.S. 600 (1979).
238. (Supp. III 1979).
239. 441 U.S. at 612, 615-20.
240. 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
241. Id. at 102. See text accompanying notes 144-68 supra.
242. See 403 U.S. at 97.
243. See McLellan v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir.
1977).
244. 106 U.S. 629 (1883).
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deprive another of the equal protection of the laws is by commis-
sion of some offence against the laws which protect the rights of
persons, as by theft, burglary, arson, libel, assault, or murder.245
Using this language, the Fifth Circuit, in McLellan v. Mississippi Power
Light Co. 246 held that the object of the conspiracy must deprive the plain-
tiff of the protections of some law, independent of section 1985(3).247 The
independent illegality test of McLellan squares with Great American
Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Novotny, 248 where the Court held
that section 1985(3) is a purely remedial statute and that the substantive
interests it protects must all be located in other law.
Commentators have generally been critical of the independent illegal-
ity approach. 249 The basic theme of this criticism is that section 1985(3) is
redundant if a violation of another statute is needed to have a section
1985(3) cause of action. Nevertheless, McLellan's independent illegality
requirement may add some remedies to those provided for the violation of
the underlying substantive statute. First, section 1985(3) provides a civil
damages remedy to the victim of unlawful conduct that otherwise may be
unavailable. 50 Second, section 1985(3) imposes liability once one shows
that the object of the conspiracy was to violate the substantive statute and
that there was an act in furtherance of the conspiracy. Therefore, it may
not be necessary for the plaintiff to prove an actual violation of the under-
lying substantive statute in order to have a section 1985(3) claim. 251
Because section 1985(3) is purely remedial, its scope largely depends
on the scope of the "laws" that it protects. In Harris, the Court indicated
that "theft, burglary, arson, libel, assault and murder" are "all laws which
protect the rights of persons" 25 2 that are encompassed by the KKK Act. 25 3
245. Id. at 643.
246. 545 F.2d 919 (5th Cir. 1977).
247. Id. at 925.
248. 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
249. See, e.g., Note, Private Conspiracies to Violate Civil Rights: McLellan
v. Mississippi Power & Light Co., 90 HARV. L. REV. 1721 (1977); Comment, Civil
Rights-Section 1985(3)-Independently Illegal Act by Defendant is Necessary
Element of Cause ofAction Under 42 U.S.C. Section 1985(3), 9 RUT. CAM. L.J.
187 (1977).
250. 545 F.2d at 927 n.32.
251. To show that the object of the conspiracy was the violation of a substan-
tive statute, when that substantive statute was not in fact violated, one may have
to show that the defendants had a specific intent to deprive the plaintiff of the
right secured by that statute. This type of mental state requirement, however, was
rejected in Griffin, 403 U.S. at 102 n.10. See text accompanying notes 155-61
supra.
252. 106 U.S. at 643.
253. Because one of the purposes of the KKK Act was to supplant or supple-
ment state courts which were ineffective in remedying injuries caused by the Ku
Klux Klan, overlap between state law causes of action and causes of action under
the KKK Act was contemplated. See Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. at 183.
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This indicates that state statutory law may be included within section
1985(3)'s reference to laws. In addition, libel and assault, two examples of
laws under Harris, are common law torts. Further, in Griffin, the substan-
tive right that was .violated may have been common law assault and battery
since the act complained of was a beating. The question should be asked
whether section 1985(3) must be read against a background of tort liabil-
ity. If so, tort law could be a substantive law that section 1985(3) was
meant to remedy. 254
b. Equal Privileges and Immunities under the Laws
The second group of interests protected by section 1985(3) is the equal
privileges and immunities under the laws. Because that section is purely
remedial, the privileges and immunities referred to must exist in law in-
dependent of section 1985(3). The privileges and immunities clause of sec-
tion 1985(3) is similar to the privileges or immunities clause of the four-
teenth amendment. 255 Since the KKK Act was enacted to enforce the pro-
visions of the fourteenth amendment, it seems plausible that the statutory
language in section 1985(3) was meant to incorporate those rights or in-
terests protected by the fourteenth amendment's privileges or immunities
clause.
In the Slaughter-House Cases,2 56 the Court interpreted the phrase
"privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States" in the fourteenth
amendment to refer only to those privileges and immunities that exist by
virtue of national citizenship. The Court started with the premise that the
primary source of citizenship is in the states. Thus, the privileges or im-
munities of United States citizens are only those privileges or immunities
that are added on to the primary privileges and immunities of state citizen-
ship by virtue of national citizenship. 257
The privileges and immunities clause of section 1985(3) can be distin-
guished, however, from the privileges or immunities clause of the four-
teenth amendment. Section 1985(3) protects those privileges and im-
munities under the laws, while the fourteenth amendment protects privil-
eges or immunities of citizens of the United States from infringement by
the states. If one focuses on the source of the privilege and immunity under
section 1985(3), then the privilege and immunity must derive from the
laws. On the other hand, the privileges or immunities under the four-
254. See id. at 187 (§ 1983). But cf. Great Am. Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n v.
Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 378 (1979) (indicates federal statutory law is not generally
"law" protected by § 1985(3)).
255. Compare 42 U.S.C. § 1985(3) (Supp. III 1979) with U.S. CONST.
amend. XIV, § 1.
256. 83 U.S (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
257. The rights of national citizenship include (1) the right to pass freely from
state to state, Crandall v. Nevada, 73 U.S. (6 Wall.) 35, 44, 48 (1868); (2) the
right to petition the government for redress of grievances, United States v.
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teenth amendment derive from national citizenship under the Slaughter-
House Cases.25
Distinguishing the privileges and immunities language of section
1985(3) from the holding in the Slaughter-House Cases on this basis is sup-
ported by the intent of Congress in enacting the KKK Act. One of the pur-
poses in ratifying the fourteenth amendment's privileges or immunities
clause was to provide a congressional power which would support section 1
of the Civil Rights Act of 1866.259 After the Act had been passed pursuant
to the enforcement power of the thirteenth amendment, it was argued that
the congressional power under that amendment was not broad enough to
support the legislation.2 60 The fourteenth amendment was ratified then in
part to provide that all citizens of the United States have uninfringed by
the states those privileges or immunities of national citizenship.2 61 Some of
the privileges and immunities referred to were rights embodied in section 1
of the Civil Rights Act.2 6 2 Thus, it was to protect the federal statutory
rights of the newly emancipated blacks that the fourteenth amendment
was ratified and the KKK Act was enacted to enforce those intended four-
teenth amendment rights. Therefore, section 1985(3)'s reference to priv-
ileges and immunities could be read to encompass statutory rights like
those in section 1 of the 1866 Act.
Unfortunately, this analysis has not been adopted by the Court. In
Novotny,2 63 the plaintiff argued that the right to be free from employment
discrimination on the basis of sex as secured to persons by Title VII of the
Cruikshank, 92 U.S. 542, 552 (1876); (3) the right to vote for national officers, Ex
parte Yarbrough, 110 U.S. 651, 662-67 (1884); (4) the right to enter public lands,
United States v. Waddell, 112 U.S. 76, 79 (1884); (5) the right to be protected
from violence while in the lawful custody of a United States Marshall, Logan v.
United States, 144 U.S. 263, 283 (1892); (6) the right to inform the United States
authorities of violations of its laws, In re Quarles, 158 U.S. 532, 535-36 (1895); (7)
the right to carry on interstate commerce, Crutcher v. Kentucky, 141 U.S. 47, 57
(1891); (8) the right under 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976) to own property, Oyama v.
California, 332 U.S. 633, 640 (1948). See generally Twining v. New Jersey, 211
U.S. 78, 97 (1908). See also Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496 (1939) (three Justices
held that the first amendment rights of free speech and press are privileges or im-
munities of national citizenship).
258. 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873).
259. Ch. 31 § 1, 14 Stat. 27. See J. TENBROEK, supra note 2, at 183-84. See
also Gressman, supra note 2, at 1328-29.
260. J. TENBROEK, supra note 2, at 156-80.
261. For a discussion of the early privileges and immunities clause cases from
which the fourteenth amendment's privileges or immunities clause is derived, see
Fairman, Does the Fourteenth Amendment Incorporate the Bill of Rights? The
Original Understanding, 2 STAN. L. REV. 5, 9-15 (1949).
262. Compare ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27 (1866) with U.S. CONST. amend. XIV,
§1.
263. 442 U.S. 366 (1979).
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Civil Rights Act of 1964 was a privilege and immunity under the law within
the meaning of section 1985(3). The Court pointed to the detailed admin-
istrative procedure Congress provided for complainants under Title VII
and noted that "[ilf a violation of Title VII could be asserted through §
1985(c), a complainant could avoid most if not all of these detailed and
specific provisions of the law." 264 Since "the complainant could completely
bypass the administrative process, which plays such a crucial role in the
scheme established by the Congress in Title VII," the Court concluded
"that § 1985(c) may not be invoked to redress violations of Title VII."265
The Court in Novotny decided that Title VII was not a privilege and
immunity under the law in spite of the holding infohnson v. REA, Inc. 266
that the passage of Title VII did not repeal impliedly 42 U.S.C. § 1981.27
Section 1981 and Title VII have some area of overlap. 2 68 Because interests
encompassed by section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866, the predecessor
of section 1981, were intended to be encompassed by the "privileges and
immunities under the laws" language of section 1985(3),269 the Novotny
Court's failure to investigate the relationship between section 1981 and Ti-
tle VII is a serious omission. The Court instead distinguished the rights
created by the Civil Rights Act of 1866 from those rights based on the KKK
Act, finding that the rights created under the 1866 Act were substantive
while those "created" under the KKK Act were only remedial.270 Ap-
parently, the Court considers it easier to repeal impliedly a remedial
statute than a statute creating substantive rights. The Court in Novotny,
by focusing on the remedy in the substantive right to determine the
breadth of "privileges and immunities under the laws," rather than Con-
gress' intent or purpose in using this language may have excluded federal
statutory rights as substantive rights that may be remedied by section
1985(3).
The words "privileges and immunities under the laws" were chosen by
the Forty-Second Congress for use in section 1985(3) because of a well-
known case, Corfield v. Coryell,271 which interpreted the privileges and
immunities clause of article IV, section 2 of the Constitution by stating:
The inquiry is, what are the privileges and immunities of citizens
in the several states? We feel no hesitation in confining these ex-
pressions to those privileges and immunities which are, in their
264. Id. at 375-76.
265. Id. at 376, 378.
266. 421 U.S. 454, 456-61 (1975).
267. (Supp. III 1979).
268. See generally Johnson v. REA, Inc., 421 U.S. 454 (1975).
269. See text accompanying notes 259-62 supra.
270. 442 U.S. at 377. Additionally, the Court distinguished 42 U.S.C. § 1982
(1976), which derived from § 1 of the 1866 Act, from § 1985(3) on the basis that §
1985(3) created only a remedy while § 1982 created substantive rights. Id.
271. 6 F. Cas. 546 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1823).
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nature,fundamental; which belong, of right, to the citizens of all
free governments; and which have, at all times, been enjoyed by
the citizens of the several states which compose this Union .... 272
By its reference to fundamental rights, Corfield may be a basis for the
incorporation of due process rights into those privileges and immunities
under the laws for purposes of section 1985(3). Some courts hold that four-
teenth amendment due process rights are not encompassed by section
1985(3), because section 1985(3) does not have a due process clause.2 73
Nevertheless, if the reference to privileges and immunities under the laws
in section 1985(3) refers to rights that are fundamental, such as the right to
hold property as was embodied in section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1866,
then there is a basis for incorporating fundamental rights protected by the
due process clause of the fourteenth amendment into the language
"privileges and immunities under the laws. ' 274
Such incorporation may, however, introduce a state action require-
ment into section 1985(3) because fourteenth amendment due process
clause rights may exist only as against the states. Therefore, if the privilege
and immunity encompassed by section 1985(3) is a fourteenth amendment
right, the defendant must be a state actor for purposes of the fourteenth
amendment. 275
III. SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION
A. Federal Subject Matter Jurisdiction
Two federal statutory provisions, 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a)276 and 28 U.S.C.
§ 1343(a),277 were once both needed as jurisdictional premises for a section
1983 or section 1985(3) claim.278 Each provision is treated separately in the
following discussion.
272. Id. at 551 (emphasis added).
273. See, e.g., Dunn v. Gazzola, 216 F.2d 709, 711 (1st Cir. 1954); Jennings
v. Nester, 217 F.2d 153, 154 (7th Cir. 1954), cert. denied, 349 U.S. 958 (1955);
Weaver v. Haworth, 410 F. Supp. 1032, 1036 (E.D. Okla. 1975); Brosten v.
Scheeler, 360 F. Supp. 608, 614 (N.D. Ill. 1973), affd mem., 495 F.2d 1375 (7th
Cir. 1974); Rundle v. Madigan, 356 F. Supp. 1048, 1050 (N.D. Cal. 1972); Allen
v. Corsano, 56 F. Supp. 169, 172 (D. Del. 1944).
274. See Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227, 1234-35 (8th Cir. 1971) (freedom
of religion is encompassed by § 1985(3)).
275. See, e.g., Cohen v. Illinois Inst. of Tech., 524 F.2d 818, 828 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S. 943 (1976); Dombrowski v. Dowling, 459 F.2d 190,
196 (7th Cir. 1972). But see Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971) (the
right of freedom of religion extended against private actors).
276. (1976).
277. (Supp. III 1979).
278. At one time it was thought that 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (Supp. III 1979)
could be used only for the vindication of personal, not property, rights. See, e.g.,
Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496, 527-31 (1939) (Stone, J., concurring); Eisen v.
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1. 28 U.S.C. Section 1331(a)
It is no longer necessary to meet the jurisdictional amount in con-
troversy requirement of 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a), 279 when seeking federal
judicial redress for either section 1983 or section 1985(3) claims. 280 Until
recently, however, section 1331(a) impeded federal determination of such
claims by requiring that "the matter in controversy ... [exceed] the sum or
value of $10,000, exclusive of interest and costs." 28' The controversy must
have been capable of monetary valuation for the jurisdictional amount re-
quirement to be satisfied. 28 2 Even though since 1976 the $10,000 amount
in controversy did not need to be met for jurisdiction in a Bivens-type28 3 ac-
tion, 284 this requirement was troublesome because claims under either sec-
tion 1983 or section 1985(3) concerning state actors often involved in-
tangible rights which were impossible to value in monetary terms. 28 Ap-
parently for this reason, 286 Congress chose to repeal the jurisdictional
amount in controversy requirement in federal question cases, except in
limited circumstances. 287
Eastman, 421 F.2d 560, 563 (2d Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 841 (1970).
This distinction was abolished in Lynch v. Household Fin. Corp., 405 U.S. 538,
542 (1972).
279. (1976) (amended 1980).
280. See Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980, Pub. L.
No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
281. 28 U.S.C. § 1331(a) (1976) (amended 1980).
282. If a claim was incapable of monetary valuation, then it was dismissed.
See, e.g., Lister v. Comm'rs Court, 566 F.2d 490, 493 (5th Cir. 1978).
283. There is an analogue of the § 1983 action against federal actors: a cause
of action implied from the Constitution itself. See, e.g., Carlson v. Green, 446
U.S. 14 (1980) (8th amendment); Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents, 403
U.S. 388 (1971) (4th amendment).
284. A 1976 amendment to § 1331(a), Act of Oct. 21, 1976, Pub. L. No.
94-574, § 2, 90 Stat. 2721, allowed actions to be "brought against the United
States, any agency thereof, or any officer or employee thereof in his official
capacity" without the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement being met.
Section 1983 actions, however, are not applicable to federal actors. See notes
34-46 and accompanying text supra. It is unclear whether a federal actor can be a
"person" under § 1985(3). See text accompanying note 48 supra.
285. See, e.g., Carey v. Piphus, 435 U.S. 247 (1978).
286. The House Report concerning the bill (S. 2357) to eliminate the
jurisdictional amount in controversy stated:
The $10,000 requirement is particularly troublesome because it tells cer-
tain citizens ... that although their Federal rights have been violated,
their injury is too insignificant to warrant the attention of a Federal
judge. It ignores the fact that many important claims are incapable of
economic valuation and it operates in total disregard of the importance,
difficulty or far-reaching nature of the Federal claim at issue.
H.R. REP. No. 1461, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 2 (1980), reprinted in [1981] U.S.
CODE CONG. & AD. NEWS 9123, 9123-24.
287. Congress left intact the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement for
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In December of last year, Congress passed the Federal Question
Jurisdictional Amendments Act of 1980.288 The legislature left no doubt
about the purpose of the Act. According to the House Report, "[t]he pur-
pose of the proposed legislation is to abolish the $10,000 amount in con-
troversy requirement in Federal question cases." 289 Consequently, the im-
pediment of section 1331(a) no longer limits access to the federal courts to
vent section 1983 and section 1985(3) claims.
2. 28 U.S.C. Section 1343(a)
a. Section 1983 and Section 1343(a)(3)
The jurisdictional counterpart to section 1983 is 28 U.S.C. §
1343(a)(3). 290 Although section 1343(a)(3) originally may have been co-
extensive with section 1983, it now does not cover all section 1983
claims.2 91 Section 1983 encompasses interests protected by the "Constitu-
tion and laws" which have been interpreted to include all federal statutory
law. 292 Section 1343(a)(3) provides original jurisdiction in district courts
for any civil action authorized by law to redress "the deprivation... of any
right, privilege, or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United
States or by any Act of Congress providing for equal rights of citizens or of
all persons within the jurisdiction of the United States." 293 This language
has been interpreted to include only "civil rights statutes." 294
Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization295 is the leading
case on determining what kinds of constitutional deprivations are included
in section 1343(a)(3) and what federal statutes provide for equal rights
under section 1343(a)(3). In Chapman, a welfare board denied the claim-
ant's request for $163 in emergency assistance funds to pay a heating bill.
The request was denied because claimant was not "in a state of homeless-
ness" as was required by state regulations. Claimant's theory was that the
state, by impermissibly restricting the eligibility requirements, was deny-
ing her funds to which she was entitled under the Social Security Act. The
amount in controversy was $163 so section 1331(a)'s $10,000 amount in
the Consumer Product Safety Act. Federal Question Jurisdictional Amendments
Act of 1980, § 3, 94 Stat. 2369-70 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
288. Pub. L. No. 96-486, 94 Stat. 2369 (to be codified in 28 U.S.C. § 1331).
289. H.R. REP. No. 1461, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1980), reprinted in [1981]
U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 9123, 9123.
290. (Supp. III 1979). Section 1343(a)(3) originated as part of§ 1 of the KKK
Act, but was separated from the Act and modified during the 1874 revision of the
United States Statutes. See note 1 supra.
291. See, e.g., Chapman v. Houston Welfare Rights Organization, 441 U.S.
600 (1979).
292. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).
293. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(3) (Supp. III 1979).
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controversy requirement was not satisfied. The claimant tried to get
jurisdiction under section 1343(a)(3) and section 1343(a)(4). There were
three relevant theories.
First, claimant argued that the supremacy clause was a part of the
Constitution that secured to her federal statutory rights for purposes of
section 1343(a)(3) by giving the federal statutory rights priority over state
law when the two conflict. The Court held that rights secured by the
supremacy clause are not rights "secured by the Constitution of the United
States" within the meaning of section 1343(a)(3). The Court reasoned that
if it was the intent to include the supremacy clause within those rights,
privileges, and immunities "secured by the Constitution of the United
States," then that statute's later reference to acts of Congress "providing
for equal rights" would be entirely superfluous. Thus, to give meaning to
all parts of section 1343(a)(3), the supremacy clause should not be included
as a part of the Constitution of the United States for purposes of section
1343(a)(3).116
Second, claimant argued that section 1983 was a federal statute that
provides for "equal rights" under section 1343(a)(3). The Court rejected
this contention because "§ I of the Civil Rights Act of 1871 did not provide
for any substantive rights-equal or otherwise." 297 Section 1983 creates
only a remedy for the violation of a right that exists independent of section
1983; "it does not provide any rights at all. '298
Third, claimant argued that section 1983 was an act of Congress "pro-
viding for the protection of civil rights" 299 under section 1343(a)(4). The
Court held that even though section 1983 provides a cause of action or
remedy for the protection of civil rights, it is not a statute that provides for
the "protection of civil rights," because "§ 1983 does not provide any
substantive rights at all."'300 Thus, jurisdiction for a section 1983 claim
cannot be found under section 1343(a)(4).
In Maine v. Thiboutot,90' decided after Chapman, the Court held
that the words "and laws" added to section 1 of the KKK Act during the
1874 revision broadened the scope of section 1983 to include a cause of ac-
tion based solely on the violation of a federal statutory right. Yet, Chap-
man implied that section 1343(a)(3) cannot be used as a jurisdictional
basis for a section 1983 claim that is based solely on a federal statutory
right. 302 Therefore, section 1983 claims which were based solely on the
296. Id. at 612-15.
297. Id. at 617.
298. Id. at 618.
299. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(4) (Supp. 1111979).
300. 441 U.S. at 618-20.
301. 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980).
302. Chapman does leave open the possibility that § 1343(a)(3) could be used
as a jurisdictional premise for the violation of a civil rights statute.
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violation of a federal statutory right were not cognizable in the federal
courts unless the $10,000 amount in controversy requirement was met.
30 3
b. Section 1985(3) and Its Special Jurisdictional Statutes
Finding jurisdiction for a section 1985(3) action for damages is fairly
simple. Section 1343(a)(1) allows jurisdiction to recover damages under
section 1985 for injury to one's person or property, or for the "deprivation
of any right or privilege of a Citizen of the United States."
3 0 4
It is more difficult to obtain federal subject matter jurisdiction for a
section 1985(3) claim for equitable relief. Although section 1985(3), on its
face, allows the recovery of only money damages, a number of courts have
been unwilling to deny to themselves the power of fashioning an equitable
remedy for relief in a section 1985(3) claim.3 0 5 These courts have implied
the power to grant equitable relief from section 1985(3) as an inherent
power of the judiciary to create equity.
There are at least two problems in finding jurisdiction for this equit-
able claim. First, sections 1343(a)(3) and (4), the only parts of section 1343
which provide jurisdiction for equitable relief, allow only "action[s]
authorized by law."3 0 6 The word "law" may preclude a court from creating
jurisdiction by exercise of its equitable powers. Second, section 1985(3) is a
purely remedial statute.3 0 7 Thus, under the analysis used in Chapman,
section 1985(3) cannot be an "Act of Congress providing for the protection
of civil rights" under section 1343(a)(4).308 Thus, section 1343(a)(4) is not
available for section 1985(3) claims.
B. State Subject Matter Jurisdiction
In Martinez v. California,30 9 the Court reserved for later decision the
question of whether state courts are required to hear section 1983
claims.310 The states are divided on the question of whether they allow sec-
tion 1983 claims to be litigated in their courts. The majority view,
303. 100 S. Ct. at 2506 n.6. See notes 280, 286-89 supra.
304. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a)(1) (Supp. III 1979).
305. See, e.g., Mizell v. North Broward Hosp. Dist., 427 F.2d 468 (5th Cir.
1970); Action v. Gannon, 450 F.2d 1227 (8th Cir. 1971); Freeman v. New Jersey
Comm'n of Investigation, 359 F. Supp. 1053 (D.N.J.), vacated, 486 F.2d 176 (3d
Cir. 1973). The Mizell case justifies implying the power to grant equitable relief
from § 1985(3) by analogizing § 1985(3) to 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1976). In Jones v.
Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409 (1968), the Court implied the right to recover
money damages and to obtain equitable relief under § 1982, even though § 1982
does not mention explicitly either remedy. Id. at 414.
306. 28 U.S.C. § 1343(a) (Supp. III 1979).
307. Great Am. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Novotny, 442 U.S. 366, 372
(1979).
308. See text accompanying notes 295-303 supra.
509. 100 S. Ct. 553 (1980).
310. Id. at 558 n.7.
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represented by cases such as Brown v. Pitchess,31I allows section 1983
claims in state courts. These courts rely on the rule that jurisdiction for
federal claims lies in the state courts unless a federal jurisdictional statute
confers exclusive jurisdiction on the federal courts. Section 1343(a)(3) con-
fers original, not exclusive, jurisdiction. The minority view, represented
by Chamberlain v. Brown,31 2 starts with the premise that one of the pur-
poses in enacting the KKK Act was to provide a federal forum for the vin-
dication of federal rights because the state courts were not enforcing
federal and state laws against the paramilitary terrorist organizations that
sprang up after the Civil War. Therefore, state courts should not entertain
section 1983 suits, since section 1983 was directed towards federal, not
state, courts.
IV. CONCLUSION
There is a plethora of conflicting notions shaping the interpretations
of the remaining remnants of the KKK Act, 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and 42
U.S.C. § 1985(3). The Court has seemingly taken a "seesaw approach" to
the interpretation of these statutes and few points of doctrine in this area
are certain. 31
3
It should be remembered, however, that the KKK Act was enacted to
remedy the organized, systematic deprivation of basic civil rights. Over
one hundred years after the enactment of that Act, public and private
organizations, even organizations less notorious than the Ku Klux Klan,
still can and do threaten the integrity of these basic individual rights. For
this reason, even though the Court has held that these provisions are only
remedial in nature, sections 1983 and 1985(3) should be read sympathe-
tically with respect to organizational liability and liability of supervisory
officials.
PHILLIP K. GEBHARDT
311. 13 Cal. 3d 518, 531 P.2d 772, 119 Cal. Rptr. 204 (1975). Accord, New
Times, Inc. v. Arizona Bd. of Regents, 110 Ariz. 367, 519 P.2d 169 (1974);
Silverman v. University of Colo., 36 Colo. App. 269, 541 P.2d 93 (1975), rev'd on
other grounds, 192 Colo. 75, 555 P.2d 1155 (1976); Alberty v. Daniel, 25 Ill.
App. 3d 291, 323 N.E.2d 110 (1974); Thiboutot v. State, 405 A.2d 230 (Me.
1979), affd, 100 S. Ct. 2502 (1980); Rzeznik v. Chief of Police, 373
N.E.2d 1128 (Mass. 1978); Dudley v. Bell, 50 Mich. App. 678, 213 N.W.2d 805
(1973); Shapiro v. Columbia Union Nat'l Bank & Trust Co., 576 S.W.2d 310
(Mo. En Banc 1978), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 831 (1979); Clark v. Bond Stores,
Inc., 41 A.D.2d 620, 340 N.Y.S.2d 847 (1973); Holt v. City of Troy, 78 Misc. 2d
9,355 N.Y.S.2d 94 (1974); Williams v. Greene, 36 N.C. App. 80, 243 S.E.2d 156
(1978); Commonwealth ex rel. Saunders v. Creamer, 11 Pa. Commw. Ct. 160,
312 A.2d 454 (1973), vacated, 464 Pa. 2, 345 A.2d 702 (1975); Terry v. Kolski, 78
Wis. 2d 475, 254 N.W.2d 704 (1977).
312. 223 Tenn. 25,442 S.W.2d 248 (1969). See also Beauregard v. Wingard,
230 F. Supp. 167 (S.D. Cal. 1964).
313. See Maine v. Thiboutot, 100 S. Ct. at 2515 (Powell, J., dissenting).
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